North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and Beaches: The Rights of Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century by Kalo, Joseph J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 83
Number 6 North Carolina Issue Article 3
9-1-2005
North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public
Waters and Beaches: The Rights of Littoral Owners
in the Twenty-First Century
Joseph J. Kalo
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and Beaches: The Rights of Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First
Century, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 1427 (2005).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol83/iss6/3
NORTH CAROLINA OCEANFRONT PROPERTY
AND PUBLIC WATERS AND BEACHES: THE
RIGHTS OF LITTORAL OWNERS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
JOSEPH J. KALO*
During the late twentieth century, the North Carolina barrier islands
became summer recreational destinations of choice. People flocked
to the coast and development of oceanfront property surged. With
more people on the beach, there were more conflicts between the
beach-going public and oceanfront property owners. With more
oceanfront development, the risks of property damage and
economic loss from hurricanes and other storms generated
demands for seawalls and beach nourishment projects to protect
these investments. In resolving these conflicts and demands,
questions about the nature and extent of the littoral rights of North
Carolina oceanfront property owners frequently arise. In this
Article, the author examines the traditional list of littoral rights,
North Carolina case law, and legislative enactments and concludes
that the traditional list no longer accurately describes the rights of
oceanfront property owners in the twenty-first century. In the
course of this examination, the author identifies what common law
and statutory littoral rights oceanfront property owners have today,
and explores the circumstances under which an oceanfront property
owner may lose these rights. The author concludes the Article with
a list of the modern littoral rights of oceanfront property owners.
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INTRODUCTION
For much of North Carolina's history, the scope of the littoralI
rights of oceanfront property owners2 was not a subject of litigation.3
1. The traditional term for oceanfront property is "littoral" and is derived from litus,
the Latin word for shore. JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS § 148,
at 301 n.1 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 2d ed. 1891). The term "littoral" was also applied to
the rights of property owners on small lakes and ponds. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 6.02(b) at 6-99 (Robert E. Beck ed., Lexis Nexis ed. 1991, repl. vol. 2001) [hereinafter 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS]. "Littoral" as used in this Article is confined to
oceanfront and inlet front property.
2. The phrase "oceanfront property owner" as used in this Article includes land that
fronts on the inlets connecting the Atlantic waters with the waters of the sounds. In some
instances, due to the wording of particular statutes, a distinction may be drawn between
ocean and inlet front property, but the general thesis of this Article is that the littoral
rights of oceanfront and inlet front owners are, and should be, the same.
3. In fact, the first Supreme Court of North Carolina case, in which the scope of
littoral rights of oceanfront or inlet front property owners was a litigated issue was decided
in 1970. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177
S.E.2d 513 (1970). Carolina Beach Fishing Pier is discussed at several places later in this
Article. An earlier case, Capune v. Robbins, contains in dicta a discussion of the littoral
right to pier out, but no littoral right was actually at issue. 273 N.C. 581, 160 S.E.2d 881
(1968). Capune is discussed infra Part IV. Only one other supreme court case, State v.
Johnson, even has any possible relevance to the scope of any littoral right of either
oceanfront or inlet front property owners. 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E.2d 371 (1971). Johnson
is discussed infra Part III.D.2. It was not until 1999 that the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina decided a case in which oceanfront or inlet front littoral rights were in issue. See
Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 517 S.E.2d 406 (1999)
(involving the migration of an inlet and the parties' right to control erosion). Since that
time there has been only one other such case dealing with similar issues. See Slavin v.
Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 58-61, 584 S.E.2d 100, 101-02 (2003). Both of the
court of appeals cases are discussed in this Article infra Parts IV.B.3 and V.A. In all other
decided cases involving the existence and scope of the rights of waterfront property
owners, the subject waterfront property is riparian, soundfront, or located on other inland
coastal waters.
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Perhaps this was due in part to the slow pace and low intensity of
development on the North Carolina barrier islands,4 the difficulty of
access to the more remote regions,5 and the lack of opportunities for
conflict between oceanfront property owners, the State, and the
general public. All of that changed during the latter half of the
twentieth century. During that period, improved access brought a
markedly increased intensity of private oceanfront development and
thousands of beachgoers to the barrier islands.6 As the density of
The general assumption has been that waterfront property is waterfront property
and owners of waterfront property on navigable waters share the same set of unique rights
irrespective of whether the navigable water is a river, a sound, or the Atlantic Ocean. See,
e.g., Capune, 273 N.C. at 588-39, 160 S.E.2d at 885-86 (attributing the same rights as
appurtenant to all lands abutting public waters and, at various places in the opinion, citing
as authority both cases involving riparian property and littoral property interchangeably).
However, in this Article, I contend that assumption is flawed.
4. See Migrating Barrier Islands, in STATE OF THE COAST REPORT (North Carolina
Coastal Fed'n 1999), at 8 [hereinafter Migrating Barrier Islands] (detailing the history of
development in North Carolina). Until the 1920s, development was very sparse on the
northern Outer Banks due to its remote location. Id. In the 1930s, coastal state Highway
12 was built and development began. Id. The first incorporated town was Nags Head in
1923, and between 1923 and 1970 only seventeen more towns were incorporated with a
total of 11,879 residents and three times as many seasonal visitors. Id.; see also THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, ISLANDS, CAPES, AND SOUNDS: THE NORTH CAROLINA COAST 91
(1982) (explaining that by 1978 the twenty-three mile stretch of the outer banks north .of
Dare County was not developed due to the absence of a public road, which ended near
Duck); id. at 212-14 (describing that until the 1950s Bogue Banks was virtually
undeveloped and remained so'until a new bridge was completed in 1971, giving easy access
to that part of the island); id. at 238-41 (explaining that Bald Head Island remained
undeveloped until the early 1980s due to a lack of access); id. at 242 (describing that in the
early 1980s, Sunset Beach, a small island, was relatively undeveloped).
5. See Migrating Barrier Islands, supra note 4, at 8.
6. Id. (stating that "[a]fter 1960 several decades of hurricane inactivity provided an
atmosphere conducive to beach development" on the northern Outer Banks). Other
authors have observed:
Currently six of the eight North Carolina coastal counties are growing faster than
the state average; two are growing at well over twice the state average. Nor will
the growth along our coasts diminish anytime soon. Estimates indicate that by
2010, more than 125 million Americans will be living near the coast, a 60 percent
increase from 1960.
ORRIN PILKEY ET AL., THE NORTH CAROLINA SHORE AND ITS BARRIER ISLANDS:
RESTLESS RIBBONS OF SAND 10 (Duke Univ. Press 1998). The 1970 Currituck County
census recorded a population of 6,900. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 90. As the 1970s
progressed, the previously stable population began to grow rapidly. Id. "By 1980, there
were 10,600 permanent residents and several thousand additional seasonal residents in
Currituck County." Id.; see also id. at 241-43 (discussing how development along the
Brunswick County barrier island beaches has almost entirely occurred in the last twenty-
five years).
The influx of a large number of sun-worshiping, beach-seeking tourists, the
establishment of numerous public beach access points, and oceanfront property owners'
heightened concerns about privacy and private property rights have disturbed the
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oceanfront development increased so too did the consequences of
living close to ocean waters. In many places the severe erosive effects
of hurricanes, storms, waves, currents, jetties, dredging, and other
activities have left the waters of the Atlantic lapping at the
foundations of million dollar oceanfront homes, condominiums,
hotels, and businesses,7 and have led to increasing demands that the
State protect these investments by re-establishing erosion-prone
beaches through beach nourishment projects8 or by permitting owners
of threatened structures to construct protective seawalls or otherwise
harden the shoreline.9 Then, when the State responds with an
expensive beach nourishment project financed through the
expenditure of large amounts of public money, some of the owners of
previously threatened oceanfront property resent the implication that
in the process they have lost some portion of what they viewed as
their traditional common law property rights.?° Or, if the State
traditionally easy accommodation of private and public interests on the state's shores.
Conflicts, as of yet unresolved, have arisen over the public's right to use the privately-
owned dry sand beach lying above the mean high tide line. See generally Joseph J. Kalo,
The Changing Face of The Shoreline: Public and Private Rights to the Natural and
Nourished Dry Sand Beaches of North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1869 (2000) (examining
the relationship between seaward boundary lines and the public's right to use the dry sand
beaches of North Carolina).
7. See Martha Quillin, Nature Washing Homes Away, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Dec. 9, 2001, at B1 ("About half of the North Topsail houses facing severe erosion
are imminently threatened. Three houses ... already have been condemned because the
ocean has scoured several feet of sand from around their support piers and has torn apart
electrical, water and sewer connections."); see also Jerry Allegood, Mason Inlet on the
Move, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 14, 2002, at A3 ("With water slapping at
the sandbag barricade at the resort, many worried condo owners bailed out."); Jerry
Allegood, Seaside Towns Need Sand, Money, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct.
10, 1999, at Al (describing the effects of Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd on oceanfront
homes and property).
8. See Migrating Barrier Islands, supra note 4, at 10 (describing that after a thirty-five
year lull in hurricane activity, Hurricanes Bertha (1996), Fran (1996), Bonnie (1998),
Dennis (1999), and Floyd (1999) hit the Carolina coast, washing away protective dunes
and leading concerned oceanfront property owners to ask the government for help in
putting sand on their beaches); see also Richard Stradling and Wade Rawlins, Beach
Towns Line up for More Sand, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 6, 2003, at Al
("The sea gnaws a couple of feet from most North Carolina beaches each year, through
erosion and rising water levels. To keep homes from teetering over the surf, more and
more communities are looking to the federal government to help put the sand back.").
9. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Gawkers Flock to Shell Island: 'They're at the Mercy of
the Ocean Now', NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 19,1998, at Al (discussing the
North Carolina seawall ban and Shell Island's property owners' desire for an exemption
from that ban, believing a seawall is their only hope for saving Shell Island).
10. See, e.g., Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 58-59, 584 S.E.2d 100,
101 (2003), which is discussed in detail in Part IV.B.3 of this Article. The central issue in
Slavin was the claim of oceanfront property owners alleging their right of access had been
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refuses to allow the construction of some protective device, the
oceanfront property owners, whose houses or other structures face
destruction from the relentless forces of nature, believe that they are
being denied the exercise of some fundamental common law littoral
right to protect their property." And, the influx of large numbers of
sun-worshipping, beach-seeking tourists, the establishment of
numerous public beach access points, and oceanfront property
owners' heightened concerns about privacy and private property
rights have generated conflicts between oceanfront property owners
and the beach-goers over the right of the public to use the dry sand
beaches of the state.12 In light of these changes rapidly taking place
on the barrier islands of North Carolina, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century it seems appropriate to take a serious, detailed
look at what are in fact the littoral rights of oceanfront property
owners, what limitations exist, and when those rights may be
extinguished without paying compensation to the affected oceanfront
property owners.
3
taken when, following a beach nourishment project, they were prohibited from going
directly from their oceanfront homes to the nourished beach. Id.
11. See, e.g., Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217,
219-20, 517 S.E.2d 406, 409-10 (1999). After the defendants refused to give the plaintiffs a
permit to build various hardened erosion control structures, including a sea wall, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint, requesting relief for, among other things, "damages for a
taking of their property without just compensation by reason of the defendants' denial of
their application for a CAMA permit for construction of a permanent erosion control
structure." Id. at 220, 517 S.E.2d at 410. Part V of this Article discusses the question of
whether oceanfront property owners have a common law right to erect hardened erosion
control structures.
12. This conflict has disturbed the traditional easy accommodation of the private and
the public on the state's shores. At the present time, Giampa v. Currituck County, a
lawsuit challenging the public right to use the dry sand beaches, is pending. No. 98 CVS
153 (N.C. Super. Ct., filed June 19, 1998). For a description of the lawsuit, see Kalo, supra
note 6, at 1870-78.
13. This Article does not address the issue of whether the public has a common law
customary right to use all dry sand, oceanfront beaches in the state of North Carolina
regardless of whether the legal title to the dry sand beach is privately or publicly held.
However, it is my position that such a right does exist and any private title to the dry sand
beach is encumbered by this public right. Neither an explicit legislative or judicial
recognition of such a right would result in the extinguishment of any private interest for
which compensation would be constitutionally required. The dry sand beach is that
flat area of sand seaward of the dunes or bulkhead which is flooded on an irregular
basis by storm tides or unusually high tides. It is an area of private property which
the State maintains is impressed with public rights of use under the public trust
doctrine and the doctrine of custom or prescription.
Advisory Opinion Ocean Beach Renourishment Projects N.C.G.S. § 146-6(f), Op. Att'y
Gen. 279 (Oct. 15, 1996) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ncdoj.com/
DocumentStreamerClient?directory=AGOpinions&file=279.pdf (on file with the North
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The courts, legislatures, and regulators frequently use the terms
"littoral" and "riparian" 14 interchangeably.15 But the central thesis of
this Article is that, within the state of North Carolina, the rights of
oceanfront property owners are not identical to those of property
owners abutting the sounds or coastal navigable rivers and waters.
Although their rights are similar in some areas, both judicial and
statutory changes in the traditional common law principles have
created marked differences in other areas. Consequently, in this
Article, the term "littoral" will be used when referring to oceanfront
property and the word "riparian" is reserved for all other categories
of waterfront property.
Part I of this Article briefly examines the origins of the concept
of littoral and riparian rights and identifies those rights traditionally
associated with ownership of lands abutting ocean and other
navigable waters. Part II of the Article begins the examination of the
nature and evolution of littoral rights in North Carolina. It discusses
the core right of remaining in contact with the waterbody itself. In
Part III, the effect of the natural processes of accretion, erosion, and
avulsion on the status of littoral ownership is explored. Part IV
Carolina Law Review); see also Kalo, supra note 6, at 1892-96 (examining the relationship
between seaward boundary lines and the public's right to use the dry sand beaches of
North Carolina).
14. The term "riparian" historically referred to property abutting rivers and streams.
See GOULD, supra note 1, § 148, at 300 n.1; A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES § 3.8 (West 2003) (describing the origin of term "riparian").
15. See, e.g., 1 HENRY PHILLIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 62, at 278-80 (The Lawyer's Coop. Pub. Co. 1904) (using "riparian rights" as a general
term); GOULD, supra note 1, § 148, at 300-01 (noting each term is sometimes used to
denote the other); see also Johnson v. McCown, 348 So. 2d'357, 360 (Fla. 1977) (noting that
the terms are sometimes used interchangeably).
The technically proper term for the water rights of soundfront property owners is
"littoral." See Weeks v. N.C. Dep't of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 97 N.C. App. 215,216 n.1,
388 S.E.2d 228, 229 n.1 (1990) (explaining that "littoral" not "riparian" is the proper term
for the shore of any land abutting the sea or other tidal water). However, the North
Carolina Coastal Area Management Act regulations call the water area over which a
soundfront owner has a right of access the "area of riparian access." See N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.1205(o) (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.nccoastalmanagement
.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_07h.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Also, in court
cases, the term "riparian" has been used in reference to the rights of soundfront property
owners. See, e.g., In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16,25-26, 337 S.E.2d 99, 104 (1985)
(referring to a Core Sound front owner as having "riparian rights"). For convenience, this
Article will use the term "littoral" only when referring to the water rights of oceanfront
property owners, which include owners of inlet front property. See supra note 1.
The rights of owners of property on small lakes and ponds are treated somewhat
differently from that of owners of property on rivers, streams, sounds, the Great Lakes, or
ocean waters and are not part of the discussion of this Article. See 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6:02(b), at 6-99.
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examines the impact of artificial additions to the shoreline upon an
oceanfront property owner's littoral rights and, in particular, the
effect upon the right of access to the waterbody and right of view, if
any. Part V examines the oceanfront property owner's right, if any,
to construct shoreline protection structures to prevent loss of
shoreline and buildings due to shoreline erosion. Part VI concludes
with a discussion of the littoral right of access to the navigable portion
of the waters, which normally includes the right to pier out.
However, it is my contention that, unlike riparian or soundfront
owners, oceanfront property owners do not have any right to pier out
into ocean waters.
I. THE ORIGIN OF LITTORAL RIGHTS
The concept of littoral and riparian rights is a product of evolving
nineteenth-century American jurisprudence. Earlier authorities
reflected the view that waterfront property owners possessed no
rights to the use of the waterbody different from, or superior to, those
of the general public. 6 The waterfront owner's adjacency to the
water made it easier for her or him to gain access to the water and
exercise her or his public rights of use, but this access to the water was
permissive and could be cut off by the State at any time, without
compensation. 7 But, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the
view that waterfront property owners possessed unique, valuable
rights appurtenant to their waterfront property, of which they could
not be deprived without compensation, ultimately prevailed. 18 One
leading, early twentieth-century authority enumerated these rights as:
16. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES § 94, at 116-17 (1909) (stating there are no rights in stream or body of
water which are appurtenant to waterfront land).
17. Id.; H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR
VARIOUS FORMS § 592, at 620-25 (1st ed. 1975) (stating that riparian owners have no
more rights than other members of public in the stream or any lands covered thereby).
18. 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 62, at 280 (stating that these rights come to riparian
owners by nature and they should not be deprived of them without compensation); LEWIS,
supra note 16, § 95, at 119 (stating the better and sounder rule that riparian owners have
valuable rights of which they may not be deprived without compensation). These riparian
rights were always, however, viewed as subordinate to the state's paramount public trust
rights in state navigable waters and the federal government's navigation servitude in
navigable waters of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) (acknowledging the superiority of the federal navigation
servitude); RJR Technical Co. v. Pratt, 339 N.C. 588, 592, 453 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1995)
(stating that title to public trust waters held in trust for public so that they may navigate
upon, carry on commerce upon, and fish in without interference by private parties);
LEWIS, supra note 16, § 95, at 120 (noting the state's paramount right to use waters); 9
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 65.03[3][b][i] (2000) (stating the right of the state to
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First. The right to be and remain a riparian proprietor and to
enjoy the natural advantages thereby conferred upon the land
by its adjacency to the water.
Second. The right of access to the water, including a right of
way to and from the navigable part.
Third. The right to build a pier or wharf out to the navigable
water, subject to any regulations of the State.
Fourth. The right to accretions or alluvium.
Fifth. The right to make reasonable use of the water as it flows
past or leaves the land.19
And, in the 1903 Supreme Court of North Carolina opinion in
Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, ° this same enumeration
was accepted as a list of vested rights associated with the ownership of
North Carolina waterfront property.21
The questions for the twenty-first century are: (1) Does this
traditional list of rights accurately describe the rights of oceanfront
property owners in North Carolina today?; (2) Do oceanfront
property owners possess each of these enumerated rights?; (3) What
are the dimensions and limitations of each of the rights of oceanfront
property owners?; and (4) Have modern uses of oceanfront property
given rise to any new right or rights?
protect public trust interests is superior to private water rights); id. § 65.13[5] (noting the
superiority of federal servitude over private property interests in navigable waters); see
also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.02(c)(1), at 149-56 (Robert E. Beck ed., Lexis
Nexis ed. 1991, repl. volume 1996) [hereinafter 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS]
(describing waters and property subject to use or regulation by the government without
compensation). But see Weeks v. N.C. Dep't of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 97 N.C. App.
215, 226, 388 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1990) ("The legislature's authority to protect public trust
rights always is limited by [riparian owner's] right to retain some use or value of his
property.").
19. LEWIS, supra note 16, § 100, at 128-30.
20. 132 N.C. 517, 44 S.E. 39 (1903), overruled on other grounds by Gwathmey v. State
ex rel. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Res., 342 N.C. 287, 464 S.E.2d 674 (1995).
Gwathmey does not discuss or question the Shepard's Point Land Co. list of rights of
owners of property abutting navigable waters. In fact, no North Carolina case has. The
issue in Gwathmey was what power the General Assembly had to convey to private parties
submerged lands lying under navigable waters. See infra note 46.
21. Shepard's Point Land Co., 132 N.C. at 537,44 S.E. at 46.
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II. THE CORE RIGHT: To REMAIN A LITTORAL PROPRIETOR
By definition, littoral property is land that abuts the ocean with
ocean waters forming at least one boundary,2" which is typically
described as the mean high water mark or mean high tide line.'
Traditionally, title to the area landward of the mean high water mark
is in the oceanfront property owner 24 and title to the area seaward of
that mark is held by the state as public trust submerged lands.25 This
contact with ocean waters allows the littoral owner continued direct
and immediate access to the water itself,26 and it is that continued
direct and immediate access that commands the premium typically
paid for oceanfront property.27 Consequently, the ability to retain
22. See supra note 1.
23. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.03(a)(1), at 6-135. See
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc., v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 177
S.E.2d 513, 516-17 (1970) (computing the high water mark as an average of high-tide
water levels).
24. TARLOCK, supra note 14, § 3.35.
25. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, § 30.01(d)(1), at 23 (discussing
state sovereignty over lands below the mean high tide line and the public trust doctrine);
id. § 30.01(d)(1)(B), at 25 (same); id. § 30.02(a), at 39-40 (same); id. § 30.02(c), at 44-46
(same).
26. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(1), at 6-4 ("The first, and
most basic, right of a riparian owner is to access to [sic] the water."); id. § 6.01(a)(5), at 6-
50 (stating "access to the water is the necessary condition to any other riparian right").
27. The traditional littoral rights reflect the generally recognized close bond that
exists between beachfront property and the water resource. It is well understood that
sellers and buyers factor those rights into the standard valuation of waterfront property.
Such an observation needs no citation of authority. But, for those looking for such
assurance, there are a large number of cases in which the courts stressed the role,
importance, and value of these rights. For example, in an early twentieth-century Florida
case, Thielsen v. Gulf, F. & A. Railway Co., the court said: "[i]n many cases, doubtless, the
riparian rights incident to the ownership of the land were the principal, if not sole,
inducement leading to its purchase by one and the reason for the price charged by the
seller." 78 So. 491, 507 (Fla. 1918). In the 1930s the City of Los Angeles used the power of
eminent domain to acquire the water in the streams flowing into Mono Lake. See City of
Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585, 586 (Cal. App. 1935). The water from the streams was
to be diverted to supply the needs of the city. Id. One consequence of the diversion was a
drastic lowering of the lake to one-tenth of its existing level within five to ten years. Id. at
587. The plaintiffs in Aitken were shoreline resort owners, whose properties would
dramatically decrease in value as a result of the lowering of the lake level. Id. In holding
that the plaintiffs were entitled to substantial sums as damages for their littoral rights to
require the maintenance of the natural level of the lake, the court said:
They purchased land bordering on this unique lake and constructed buildings and
improvements thereon for the maintenance of auto camps and pleasure resorts
which are dependent for their success upon the income derived from the traveling
public which is attracted to this alluring lake by these advantages. These
enterprises depend on the continuation of these attractions. Without the existence
of this lake and its surrounding attractions the value of the respondents' properties
will be practically destroyed. These privileges and attractions constitute important
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contact with ocean waters is the core benefit of oceanfront property
ownership.28
III. ACCRETION, EROSION, AND AVULSION AND OCEANFRONT
PROPERTY
A.. Traditional Common Law Rules
If, indeed, the most valuable and significant aspect of oceanfront
property is its contact with, and access to, ocean waters, the
traditional common law rules of property should operate to protect
that interest. Maintaining contact with ocean waters necessarily
means that the seaward boundary of oceanfront property should
always change and move as the shoreline moves through natural
cycles and processes.29 When the cycles and processes result in
accretion or other additions of beach soil to the shoreline, the
increase should benefit and belong to the oceanfront owner to whose
shoreline the accretions or additions adhere; if the cycles and
processes result in erosion or other loss of soil from the shoreline,
then the losses should be sustained by the oceanfront owner. If the
common law rules were completely consistent the boundary would
assets in determining the value of their properties. Moreover, among the essential
littoral rights which are possessed by the respondents is their lawful right to the
unmolested access to the lake.
Id. at 588-89. Even more recently, in a Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
case, the court observed that "ocean view, beach access, use and privacy are fundamental
considerations in valuing beachfront property." City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 740 A.2d
630, 641 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
28. See, e.g., Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 622, 86 S.E.2d 408, 411 (1955)
(holding that "[an indispensable requisite of the riparian doctrine is actual contact of land
with water"); see also TARLOCK, supra note 14, § 3.31 ("To qualify as riparian land, there
must be contact with a watercourse capable of supporting riparian rights."). Therefore,
without contact with ocean waters, any claim of common law littoral rights is meaningless.
On the other hand, the General Assembly, by appropriate legislation, may confer
statutory littoral rights upon former oceanfront property owners whose lands, as the result
of a beach nourishment project, are no longer in direct contact with the ocean. See infra
notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
29. See generally ORRIN PILKEY & KATHARINE L. DIXON, THE CORPS AND THE
SHORE 23 (1996) ("All beaches, however, exist in a dynamic equilibrium involving four
major controls: (1) wave and tidal energy; (2) quality and quantity of the sediment supply;
(3) beach shape and location; and (4) the level of the sea."). When one of these factors
change, the others all adjust accordingly. Id. For example, storms cause increased wave
energy and a temporary rise in sea level. Id. To compensate for this higher energy
environment, the beach will change its shape. Id. Sometimes sand gets moved offshore or
the beach flattens out. Id. The higher sea level, however, allows the beach to repair itself
by allowing waves to reach the dunes or bluffs and wash sand back to the beach, creating a
new buffer. Id.
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always be ambulatory, with its fluctuations shifting the boundary
between privately owned uplands and publicly owned waters and
submerged lands, but with the oceanfront owner always maintaining
contact with the ocean waters. However, the traditional common law
rules relating to accretion, erosion, and avulsion lack such
consistency.
The traditional rules applicable to the effects of accretion and
erosion operate to maintain the oceanfront property owner's contact
with the sea. If sand is gradually added to the beach by accretion, the
traditional rule is that the accretion belongs to the oceanfront
property owner.3 ° On the other hand, if sand is slowly eroded away
by natural forces, the oceanfront property owner loses land.3" Thus,
an oceanfront property owner's seaward boundary is not a fixed
boundary line, but an ambulatory one. With accretion and erosion
the seaward boundary always remains the mean high tide line
wherever it intersects the shoreline.
But, the common law rule is quite different if the shoreline
changes as the result of avulsion-a sudden, frequently dramatic,
shoreline change occasioned by the hammering of the shoreline by an
event such as a hurricane or the winds and waves of a northeaster or
similar violent storm. When such sudden, powerful, natural forces
cause a sudden and perceptible change in the contours of the
shoreline, the traditional rule is that the seaward boundary of
oceanfront property is not affected, does not move.32 For example, if,
after a storm, fifty feet of dry sand has been added to the beach, the
oceanfront property owner would not hold title to the new dry sand
beach because the boundary line is not where the mean high tide line
presently intersects the new, expanded beach, but where it intersected
the dry sand beach before the storm. In such circumstances, the
ocean would no longer be the seaward boundary of the property and,
technically, the owner would no longer be a littoral owner and would
not possess any common law littoral rights. So, at common law, an
avulsive change could result in a loss of that valuable feature of
oceanfront property ownership-direct contact with and access to the
ocean. On the other hand, if an avulsive event removed fifty feet of
30. See GOULD, supra note 1, § 155, at 310-11 ("Land formed by alluvion, or the
gradual and imperceptible accretion from the water ... belong to the owner of the
contiguous land to which the addition is made.").
31. Id. § 155, at 311-12 ("ILland gradually encroached upon by navigable waters
ceases to belong to the former owner.").
32. State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 146, 179 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1971) ("Avulsion, unlike
accretion, works no change in legal title."); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1,
§ 6.03(b)(2), at 6-158 to -161.
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shoreline, the oceanfront property owner would retain title to the
newly submerged lands lying between the present location of the
mean high water mark and the pre-storm location.33
Exactly why this common law discrepancy exists is not entirely
clear. In part, it may be related to the fact that the earliest
justification for the common law rules of accretion, erosion, and
avulsion was not grounded in the policy of protecting the oceanfront
property owner's contact with, and access to, the waterbody. In his
1826 treatise, Joseph Angell offers a less than entirely satisfactory
explanation for the difference in treatment. According to Angell,
when the addition to the shoreline is the result of an avulsive event:
[T]he accession so made belongs to the sovereign, as it is more
than a part and parcel of the fundus maris, or bottom of the sea,
which... [is] the property of the sovereign.
To the above rule, however, there is this important exception.
If the increase is slow and secret, and is so gradually and
insensibly occasioned as renders it impossible to perceive how
much is added in each moment of time, it then belongs to the
proprietor of the land to which the accession is made.... ."
Thus, the difference in the early treatment of avulsive events and
accretion/erosion lies both in a technical view of the source of the
addition to the uplands, which is seen as wind and wave action
moving the sovereign's submerged soil in such a manner as to rapidly
accumulate it above the high water mark, and in the practical ability
to ascertain and locate changes in a water boundary. The idea that
the rules of accretion/erosion are fundamentally linked to the littoral
owner's inherent larger right to maintain contact with ocean waters as
the shoreline moves through natural cycles and processes is a
justification that comes later in the nineteenth century.36
33. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.03(b)(2), at 6-160 ("On the
other hand, if land is either covered or uncovered by a sudden and perceptible change in
the shoreline, either by action of the water or a change in the course of a stream, the
process is called 'avulsion.' Avulsion usually leaves title as before the change in the
waterbody.").
34. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE
WATERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 68-69 (Boston, Harrison Gray 1826).
These common law rules were copied from earlier civil law rules, which were supported by
the same rationale. Id. at 69.
35. Id.
36. For example, Professor Gould noted in his treatise:
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However, the change in justification did not affect the traditional
approach to avulsion, despite the fact that the historical justification
for the avulsion rule is strained, illogical, and inconsistent with the
general policy of protecting a littoral owner's right of access.
Logically, the consequences of avulsion should be no different than
those of the natural processes of erosion and accretion.
B. The Traditional Avulsion Rule No Longer Applies to Oceanfront
Property
Early in North Carolina's history, the courts accepted the
traditional common law rules of accretion, erosion, and avulsion as
part of the state's body of common law.37 However, it can be argued
that legislation passed by the General Assembly during the twentieth
This right of access is not lost by the gradual formation of new soil upon the
margin of the water caused by the action of the tides or current .... [R]iparian
owners, if deprived of the benefit of that situation by extraneous additions, would
suffer hardship and injustice ....
GOULD, supra note 1, § 155, at 310; see also 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 69, at 320 ("One
of the most valuable of the rights of the riparian owner is the right to preserve his contact
with the water by appropriating the accretions which form along his shore."); id. § 71, at
326 ("[T]he rule giving the riparian owner the right to alluvion was adopted to preserve
the fundamental riparian right on which all others depend ... that of access to the
water."). In its 1893 opinion in Lamprey v. Metcalf, the Minnesota Supreme Court made
the following observation:
Courts and text writers sometimes give very inadequate reasons, born of a fancy or
conceit, for very wise and beneficent principles of the common law; and we cannot
help thinking this is somewhat so as to the right of the riparian owner to accretions
and relictions in front of his land. The reasons usually given for the rule are either
that it falls within the maxim, de minimis lex non curat, or that, because the
riparian owner is liable to lose soil by the action or encroachment of the water, he
should also have the benefit of any land gained by the same action. But it seems to
us that the rule rests upon a much broader principle, and has a much more
important purpose in view, viz. to preserve the fundamental riparian right-on
which all others depend, and which often constitutes the principal value of the
land-of access to the water.
53 N.W. 1139, 1142 (Minn. 1893).
37. The traditional rules of accretion, erosion, and avulsion have been part of the
common law of North Carolina since at least 1820. See Murry v. Sermon, 8 N.C. (1
Hawks) 56, 57-58 (1820) (noting an increase of shoreline soil on Mattamuskett Lake); see
also State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 146, 179 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1971) (applying the
traditional common law rules to movement of an inlet); Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc.
v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 304, 177 S.E.2d 513, 517 (1970) (applying the
traditional common law rules to beach erosion); Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v.
Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 228, 517 S.E.2d 406, 414-15 (1999) (applying the traditional
common law rules to inlet erosion). These traditional common law principles are
applicable except where modified by statute.
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century, although not explicitly discarding the traditional avulsion
rule with respect to oceanfront property,38 has that effect. When read
together, North Carolina General Statutes sections 146-6(a) and 77-
20(a) are inconsistent with the traditional avulsion rule and create a
single, uniform approach to all natural changes in ocean shorelines.
North Carolina General Statute section 146-6(a), states that "[i]f
any land is, by any process of nature ... raised above the high
watermark of any navigable water, title thereto shall vest in the owner
of that land which, immediately prior to the raising of the land in
question, directly adjoined the navigable water."39 "[A]ny process of
nature" includes hurricanes, northeasters, and wind and wave action
and is not limited to slow, gradual additions to the shoreline.
Therefore, this section clearly changes the common law avulsion rule
governing additions to the shoreline."n But, it does not address the
effect on legal title when natural forces create submerged land where
once there were uplands. If the natural forces qualify as erosion, then
the common law rule places title to such submerged land in the state.
But, whether title to submerged lands resulting from an avulsive
event lies in the state or remains in the littoral owner would still be
dependent on whether the traditional common law rule of avulsion is
applied or not.
Fortunately, section 77-20(a) appears to address this question.
The plain, unambiguous, unqualified language of section 77-20(a) is
that "[t]he seaward boundary of all property, which adjoins the ocean,
38. The term "oceanfront property" as used in this Article includes inlet front
property. However, in some instances the language of a particular statute may draw a
distinction between the two. For example, section 77-20 applies to property "which
adjoins the ocean." N.C. GEN. STAT 77-20(a) (2003). Since inlet front property
technically adjoins an inlet, arguably section 77-20(a) is not applicable. But, in 1985 when
the General Assembly amended section 77-20 and added subsections (d) and (e), defining
the term "ocean beaches" and affirming the public common law right to use ocean
beaches, the term "ocean beaches" was defined as "the area adjacent to the ocean and
ocean inlets." Id. § 77-20(e). Arguably, this suggests that the General Assembly intended
the term "ocean" to include both the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and inlets through
which those waters flow.
39. Id. § 146-6(a).
40. This reading of section 146-6(a) is not inconsistent with section 146-1(d). Section
146-1(d), added in 1995 as part of a piece of legislation designed to address the use of
public trust waters and submerged lands by marinas and other facilities, see infra note 145,
states that "[n]othing in this Subchapter shall be construed to limit or expand the full
exercise of existing common law riparian or littoral rights." Id. § 146-1(d). However, the
reading given to section 146-6(a) in this Article is not that it expands a common law right
but, rather, grants waterfront property owners a statutory right to additions resulting from
avulsive events. Unlike a common law right, if the General Assembly decided to
terminate this statutory right by a change in the applicable legislation, the waterfront
owner would not have a claim for compensation for the loss of that right.
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is the mean high water mark."4' An appropriate reading of the statute
is that the mean high water mark remains the seaward boundary
irrespective of changes in the contours of the shoreline and regardless
of whether the changes are the product of the processes of erosion
and accretion or the result of avulsion.
In addition to the language of section 77-20(a), common sense
and sound policy also require that it be read as a complete rejection
of the common law rule of avulsion. The most significant, valuable
characteristic of oceanfront property is that it is in contact with the
water allowing the owner of the oceanfront property free and
unhindered access to the water.42 But, application of the avulsion rule
would mean that, when there is a sudden, perceptible increase of the
dry sand beach, the resulting addition to the shoreline would not
belong to the littoral owner. Instead, if the boundary between the
privately-owned dry sand beach 43 and state-owned public trust
submerged lands does not move as the result of an avulsive addition
to the shoreline, the addition would belong to the state and be part of
the state's public trust lands. The effect of this would be to destroy
the littoral owner's common law littoral rights, including the private
littoral right of direct access to the ocean, and to create a ribbon of
state-owned, dry sand beach.' Such a result would certainly be
inconsistent with the expectations of littoral owners who assume that,
regardless of the cause, they hold title to any additions to the
shoreline and such additions simply extend their littoral property
seaward.45
41. Id. § 77-20(a)(22).
42. See supra note 27.
43. An area, although privately owned, is impressed with public rights of use. See
supra note 13.
44. Although the oceanfront property owner would have the same rights of use of the
state-owned, avulsion-created, public trust beach as any other member of the general
public, such rights of use are not the equivalent of the private right of use and access
possessed by a littoral owner exercising her common law littoral rights to cross land, to
which she holds fee title, to reach and access ocean waters. The authority of the State to
regulate public uses of publicly owned land is greater than its authority to regulate the use
of privately owned land.
45. In Hughes v. Washington, the issue was whether accretion belonged to the owner
of federal patent oceanfront land or to the state under a state common law rule allocating
all accretions to the state. 389 U.S. 290, 290-91 (1967). The Hughes Court held that
federal law determined the littoral rights of federal patent land and that the traditional
common law rule applied. Id. at 291. In its opinion the Court observed that "[a]ny other
rule would leave [littoral] owners continually in danger of losing the access to water which
is often the most valuable feature of their property, and continually vulnerable to
harassing litigation challenging the location of the original water lines. Id. at 293-94. The
observations are equally pertinent to the traditional common law rule governing avulsive
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This conclusion becomes especially apparent when examining
the consequences of a loss of shoreline due to an avulsive event. The
traditional rule has two sides. On one hand, the littoral owner would
not have title to additions to the shoreline; on the other, a rapid loss
of shoreline would not divest the littoral owner of title to former
upland areas that are now submerged lands. What would be the
littoral owner's rights with respect to such submerged lands? Would
the public have the same rights of use to such submerged lands as
they would to the dry sand beach or state-owned submerged lands?
Would these privately-owned submerged lands be impressed with
public trust rights of use?'
Discarding the traditional rule not only avoids these troublesome
questions, but also conforms the law to the realities of the coastal
environment and the reasonable expectations of oceanfront property
owners. The foreshore and dry sand beach are very dynamic areas of
the coast and are subject to continuous changes as a result of the
forces of wind and water. There is no line drawn in the sand that
visibly marks the location of the mean high tide line,47 the line
changes. It leaves owners continually in danger of losing access to the water and equally
subject to harassing litigation over the location of their seaward boundary.
46. In the only case to directly address the effect of the receding of the shoreline
following an avulsive event on the public's right of passage over the foreshore, People v.
Steeplechase Park Co., a New York court held that the public retained the same right of
passage over the new foreshore as it had over the old. 143 N.Y.S. 503, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1913). In other words, the littoral owner may own the foreshore and adjacent submerged
lands, but the littoral owner's title to such areas is burdened by public trust rights. The
result in the case simply recognizes the fact that the avulsion rule does not accord with
common expectations, both public and private, about title to, and rights of use of, the
foreshore and public trust submerged lands.
In the landmark case of Gwathmey v. State ex. rel Department of Environment,
Health, & Natural Resources, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the General
Assembly had the power to convey state-owned submerged lands without reservation of
public trust rights, but that there was a strong presumption that acts of the General
Assembly authorizing conveyance of such lands did not intend that such conveyances
would in any manner impair public trust rights. 342 N.C. 287, 304, 464 S.E.2d 674, 684
(1995). Absent "clear and specific words," legislation should be construed "so as to cause
no interference with the public's dominant trust rights." Id. (quoting RJR Technical Co. v.
Pratt, 339 N.C. 588, 590, 453 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1995)). By analogy, a similar presumption
should exist in the judicial application of common law littoral principles. The polestar
should be, in the absence of clear, specific, controlling precedent to the contrary, common
law principles applied in such a manner as not to impair the public's dominant public trust
rights.
47. The Borax rule dictates that the mean high tide line is the statistical average of all
high and low tides over an eighteen year period. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296
U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935). Thus, the mean high tide line is only discernible by an actual
survey. The location of the water on the beach on any particular day or hour does not
reflect the actual legal boundary separating state-owned submerged land from privately-
titled oceanfront property.
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typically marking the boundary between privately-owned shorelands
and state-owned public trust submerged lands. There is only the
water moving up and down the foreshore. Although the dry sand
beach is open to public use, the assumption of oceanfront property
owners is that the oceanward boundary of their land is the mean high
tide line, that it is an ambulatory boundary, and the boundary will
remain the mean high tide line, wherever that is physically located on
the beach, even as natural forces change the contours of the beach
itself. The common law avulsion rule is simply inconsistent with this
reasonable assumption.
Therefore, a sensible interpretation of the statutes is that North
Carolina has rejected the traditional common law rule governing
avulsive changes to the ocean shoreline. In its place is a uniform
statutory rule, treating all natural changes to the shoreline the same
and grounded in the preservation of an oceanfront property owner's
littoral status.
C. Inlet Front Property Treated the Same as Oceanfront?
Section 77-20(a) may be inapplicable to inlet front property
because technically such property does not "adjoin the ocean," but
adjoins an inlet." However, a 1998 legislative change in section 77-20
suggests that the word "ocean" now includes "ocean inlet waters." In
1998, the General Assembly amended section 77-20 by adding parts
(d) and (e). These parts define the term "ocean beaches," and affirm
the public's common law right to use ocean beaches. The added part
(e) defines the term "ocean beaches" as "the area adjacent to the
ocean and ocean inlets."4 9 Arguably, this suggests that the General
48. Whether section 77-20(a) applies to inlet front property depends upon whether
inlet front property "adjoins the ocean" within the meaning of section 77-20. Inlet
property technically adjoins the inlet and not the ocean. In 2003, in the interpretation of
another statute, section 146-6(f), which contains similar but not identical language, the
Office of the Attorney General's drew a distinction between oceanfront and inlet front
land. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2003). According to the Office of the Attorney
General, section 146-6(f), enacted in 1985 in order to determine title to land raised
through publicly financed beach nourishment and similar projects, does not apply to inlet
front land because that section is limited to land "in or immediately along the Atlantic
Ocean." Advisory Opinion Concerning Ownership of Dredged Fill and Accretions on
Bogue Banks at Bogue Inlet, Op. Att'y Gen. 558 (Sept. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion], available at http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamerClient?directory=AG
Opinions&file=Bogue%2Onlet%2OAdv%200p%20to%2OJean%20Preston%2OFinal-
558.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The wording "in or immediately
along the Atlantic Ocean" could reasonably be read as being more restrictive than the
words "adjoining the ocean."
49. § 77-20(e).
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Assembly intended the term "ocean" as used in section 77-20(a) to
include ocean inlet waters.
Even assuming section 77-20(a) is not applicable to inlet front
property, section 146-6(a) is. Section 146-6(a) does not distinguish
between property adjoining the ocean and property adjoining inlets. 0
Therefore, insofar as additions to the shoreline are concerned, all
additions would belong to the owner of the inlet front property. If
section 77-20(a) does not apply to inlet front property, the question
would remain whether a loss of inlet front land as the result of an
avulsive event changes the waterward boundary of the inlet front
land. No reasoned basis to distinguish oceanfront and inlet front
property exists, especially since the tidal waters of the Atlantic flow
past each, both are subject to the same storm and wind action, and
the demarcation between inlet front and oceanfront is a somewhat
arbitrary determination of where the ocean ends and inlet begins.51
Therefore, a uniform rule should be applicable to oceanfront and
ocean inlet front property.
D. Erosion and the Extinguishment of All Littoral Rights and
Interests
The barrier islands of North Carolina have been moving and
changing for thousands of years and will continue to do so in the
future.52 Shoreline eaten away through erosion may be restored when
the natural processes reverse and the shoreline is rebuilt through the
process of accretion. During a period of erosion, ocean waters may
move completely across an oceanfront lot so that no part of it is left
above the mean high water mark; ocean waters and the mean high
water mark are then located on the formerly non-oceanfront lot that
lay behind the now submerged oceanfront lot. Eventually, natural
processes may reverse and accretions to the shoreline may resurrect
all or a portion of the submerged lot. If that happens, to whom does
the area of accretion belong? Does it belong to the oceanfront
property owner whose land was initially eroded away by ocean waters
or does the accretion belong to the landowner whose property
became oceanfront as the result of the initial erosion? This raises the
50. See supra text accompanying note 39.
51. The demarcation between the ocean and the inlet is determined by the
COLREGS (International Regulations Preventing Collisions at Sea). See Advisory
Opinion, supra note 48, at 1 n.1.
52. PILKEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 40 ("As soon as an island forms, it immediately
begins to migrate and change in its shape, vegetation, and land form. Different lands
evolve in different ways and at different rates.").
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issue of whether North Carolina follows the majority common law
rule with respect to promotion of non-littoral land to the status of
littoral land when the waterbody moves across the fixed boundary of
the non-littoral land.
1. The Majority and Minority Rules
The majority common law rule is that once the waterbody moves
across the fixed boundary of non-littoral land, that land is promoted
to littoral status and the fixed boundary no longer exists. 3 From that
moment forward, the waterbody forms the property line of the land.
The owner of the promoted land benefits from all future accretions
and suffers the same consequences of erosion as other littoral land
owners.54 A minority rule, followed by relatively few jurisdictions, is
that non-littoral land remains non-littoral even after the waterbody
has passed over a fixed boundary. If accretion causes the re-
emergence of land above the mean high water mark, the non-littoral
owner may claim only that portion of the accretion that lies within her
original fixed boundaries. All accretions beyond those boundaries
belong to the original littoral owner, which means that the original
littoral owner's title to such raised lands is restored.56
2. The State of the Law in North Carolina
North Carolina law is not entirely clear on the issue of whether
the majority or minority rule applies to oceanfront property.
Application of the promotion rule is consistent with the reading of
relevant statutes and sound policy. North Carolina General Statute
section 77-20(a) sets the seaward boundary of "all property which ...
adjoins the ocean" as the mean high water mark.57 When, through the
process of erosion, ocean waters erode away ocean front property,
53. See GOULD, supra note 1, § 155, at 310-13.
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Ocean City Ass'n v. Shriver, 46 A. 690, 694-95 (N.J. 1900) (adopting
Lord Hale's rule that "if the land of the subject adjoining the same be swallowed up by the
sea, and it be freely left again by the reflux and recess of the sea, the owner may have his
land as before"); Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889, 897 (N.D. 1965) (holding that upon
promotion "the owner of the land that was originally nonriparian has title only to the
accreted land within the boundaries of the formerly nonriparian tract," and that all other
lands so accreted "extending over the area formerly occupied by the land of the original
riparian owner, [belong to] the owner of the original riparian land.").
56. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.27, at 858 n.7 (A. James Casner ed.,
1952) (citing "[clases to the effect that such an originally nonriparian tract will not be
enlarged beyond its original lines by either reliction or accretion, but that the added land
will belong to the former owner from whom taken by erosion or submergence").
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
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moving across, for example, the fixed rear boundary of the land and
crossing the fixed boundary of the second row, non-littoral land lying
behind it, then the formally non-littoral land would become "property
which adjoins the ocean," the boundary of which would become the
ambulatory mean high water mark. When any boundary of land is
such an ambulatory boundary, that land is by definition littoral and
subject to the erosion and accretion principles applicable to all littoral
land.
In addition, application of the promotion rule is supported by the
language of North Carolina General Statute section 146-6(a). Section
146-6(a) states that "if any land is, by any process of nature ... raised
above the high watermark of any navigable water, title thereto shall
vest in the owner of that land which, immediately prior to the raising of
the land in question, directly adjoined the navigable water."58  The
import of the statute is that the owner of lands that at any moment in
time abut ocean waters is a littoral owner and that the rules of
accretion and erosion benefit or disadvantage that land and not land
that may once have been littoral but through natural processes
became submerged land.59 Finally, application of the promotion rule
allows oceanfront owners to make those investments typical of such
owners without fear that their access to the ocean may be lost due to
the waterward migration of the shoreline and the resurrection of
submerged lands that, at some time in the past, were oceanfront
uplands property.
The source of uncertainty and confusion as to the applicable rule
in North Carolina is the 1971 opinion in State v. Johnson.' Johnson
involved the effect of a moving inlet on the boundary line between
two tracts of land.6' The two tracts of land had been separated by an
inlet, but that inlet closed in 1933 and a boundary line was then fixed
through an exchange of deeds between the owners of the tracts. 62 A
hurricane in 1944 suddenly opened a new inlet 63 north of the fixed
58. Id. § 146-6(a) (emphasis added).
59. The Office of the North Carolina Attorney General has the same interpretation of
section 146-6(a). See Advisory Opinion, supra note 48, at 3.
60. 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E.2d 371 (1971).
61. The case was part of eminent an domain proceeding brought by the State to
acquire Fort Fisher and adjacent lands. Id. at 128-29, 179 S.E.2d at 373-74.
62. Id. at 132-33, 179 S.E.2d at 375-76, 385.
63. One issue in the case was whether the inlet was in fact a new one or simply a
reopening of the old in a slightly different location. See Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 45,
State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E.2d 371 (1971) (No. 705SC653) ("It is submitted
that the inlet which opened in 1944 is the same inlet which closed around 1933 even
though it may not be in exactly the same location."). The plaintiff-appellee-the State of
North Carolina-asserted that this 1944 "reopening" of the old inlet resurrected the
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boundary. 64 Gradually that inlet migrated south, crossed the fixed
boundary, and continued its southerly migration.65 In 1968, the State
commenced a condemnation action and a dispute arose over the
ownership of a portion of the condemned land.66 The owners of the
northern tract of land claimed all the accreted land lying to the north
of the new inlet, including the land to the south of the fixed
boundary.67 They asserted that once the inlet passed over the fixed
boundary, the landowners became littoral land owners, subject to the
common law rule of accretion and erosion, and the northern
landowners were entitled to all accreted lands north of the inlet as of
1968.68 The southern land owners argued that the movement of the
inlet over the fixed boundary had no effect on the boundary between
the two tracts and the boundary remained the original fixed line.69
The Johnson court agreed with the southern land owners.7° Creating
a novel "traveling inlet" rule, the court held that the migration of a
original boundary between the two tracts, which was the inlet and not the fixed boundary
line established after it closed in 1933. If that were correct, then the two tracts were once
again riparian and the customary rules of accretion and erosion applied. As the inlet
moved south, the land accreted to the north would belong to the plaintiff-appellee and the
loss through erosion to the land to the south would be suffered by the defendant-
appellant. Id. at 46-47, 50-52. The plaintiff-appellee also asserted that, even if the inlet
was a new one, once it crossed the fixed boundary, the inlet and not the fixed boundary
was the boundary line separating the two tracts and both became riparian. Id. at 50-53. In
either event, the owners of the southern tract did not own any of the condemned land. Id.
at 53.
64. Johnson, 278 N.C. at 133-34, 179 S.E.2d at 376.
65. Id. at 134, 147, 179 S.E.2d at 376, 385.
66. The northern boundary of the new inlet was also the southern boundary of the
lands condemned. Therefore, the issue was who owned, and was entitled to compensation
for, the lands between the fixed boundary and the inlet. Id. at 128-29, 179 S.E.2d at 373-
74.
67. James E. Johnson, Jr., Albert S. Killingsworth, and Elizabeth E. Killingsworth
owned the northern tract of land. Id. at 133, 179 S.E.2d at 375.
68. Defendant-Appellee's (Johnson) Brief at 17-18, 23-27, Johnson (No. 705SC653);
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 33-34, Johnson (No. 705SC653).
69. Defendant-Appellant's (Sherrill) Brief at 33, 48-49; Johnson (No. 705SC653).
Frank 0. Sherrill and his wife, Ruth J. Sherrill, owned the southern tract of land. Johnson,
278 N.C. at 128-29, 179 S.E.2d at 373.
70. Johnson, 278 N.C. at 148, 179 S.E.2d at 385 (holding "that the southern boundary
of the ... [northern tract] is at the point where the accretion from the north connected
with the accretion from the south to close New Inlet in 1933"). New Inlet was actually the
old inlet not the new inlet opened in 1944. However, in one of those twists of fate, the
owners of the southern tract were determined not to have any claim of ownership to the
disputed tract because they had failed to show that the land described in the deeds they
offered as proof of their claim included the disputed land. Id. at 151-52, 179 S.E.2d at
387-88. The Supreme Court of North Carolina also concluded that the owners of the
northern tract only owned the land north of the fixed boundary. Id. at 152, 179 S.E.2d at
388. So who owned the disputed land? That issue was never resolved!
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"traveling inlet" does not affect boundary lines "unless such inlet in
fact was the boundary when it started its journey."7 Thus, Johnson
appears to adopt the minority rule.72
Johnson seems to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court of
North Carolina's 1970 decision in Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v.
Town of Carolina Beach.73 Although the issue in Carolina Beach was
title to land raised by filling, the language of the court is consistent
with the promotion rule. In that case, the plaintiff's lots had
completely eroded away, being submerged for more than a year, and
the mean high water mark had moved to the middle of the public
street that at one time had run behind plaintiff's lots. 74  When the
town constructed a sand berm by dredging and hauling sand from a
neighboring sound, placing that sand in the area in which plaintiff's
lots once stood, the plaintiff claimed the raised lands belonged to
him. 75 However, the court rejected the claim stating that "[t]he owner
of the riparian land ... loses title to such portions as are so worn or
washed away or encroached upon by the water. '76  "Thus, twelve
months before the berm was built, plaintiff's lots had been taken by
the sea and title thereto had vested in the State of North Carolina.""
The subsequent filling of the state-owned submerged lands in that
area and the creation of the sand berm did not resurrect plaintiff's
divested title to the area.7 ' The inference is that, as a matter of
common law, plaintiff's lots and his title to the area in which those
lots once lay were lost forever.7 9 In Johnson, however, the court
71. Id. at 148, 179 S.E.2d at 385.
72. The conclusion that the court is adopting the minority rule is based on the court's
statement of general principles and its conclusion that the "traveling inlet" did not "uproot
and supplant" the fixed boundary that existed in the Johnson case. Id. However, the cases
cited by the court are really not on point. See infra note 83.
73. 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
74. Id. at 299, 303, 177 S.E.2d at 514, 517.
75. Id. at 298-99, 177 S.E.2d at 514.
76. Id. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 477).
77. Id. at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 517.
78. Id. at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 516.
79. The North Carolina Attorney General's position is that North Carolina follows
the majority common law promotion rule. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 48, at 2.
The qualification "as a matter of common law" is necessary because as a matter of
statutory law and state regulations, a riparian owner may be able to obtain a permit to
recover "lands ... lost to the owner by natural causes." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b)
(2003). However, the right to do so extends only to an "owner of land adjoining any
navigable water." Id. § 146-6(c). But the statutory interpretation question is whether
someone whose lands have completely eroded away is still the owner of any "land
adjoining a navigable water." The North Carolina Coastal Area Management rules do
allow owners of estuarine shoreline to recover lands lost in the previous year from the
time the owner applied for permission to build a bulkhead. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
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limited the application of Carolina Beach to situations in which the
body of water was part of the legal description of the boundaries of
the land.8" When the boundary is a fixed boundary, the Johnson court
stated that the rules of accretion and erosion do not affect the
location of the boundary."
But, Johnson, arguably, was incorrectly decided, and, at best,
applicable only to "traveling inlets" which are not also part of the
boundary separating tracts of land. The Johnson court failed to
consider the relevance of section 146-6(a) to the facts, and the holding
appears to be directly contrary to that section's language.82 Once the
inlet crossed the fixed boundary, both property owners would have
been separated by a waterbody; section 146-6(a) establishes the rule
that land raised by any process of nature belongs to the owner of the
land that, prior to the raising, directly adjoined the navigable water-
in this case, a navigable inlet. In addition, the court cited no authority
for its "traveling inlet" rule and the authority it did cite has nothing to
do with the issue of promotion.83 Finally, application of the minority
7H.0208(b)(7)(D) (May 1996), available at http://www.nccoastalmanagement.net/Rules/
Text/t15a 07h.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). But this rule only
applies when there is an identifiable erosion problem. Id.
80. State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 148, 179 S.E.2d 371, 385 (1971).
81. Id.
82. Section 146-6(a) was enacted in 1959, twelve years prior to the Johnson decision.
See Act of Jun. 2, 1959, ch. 683, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 612, 614 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 146-6(a) (2003). None of the briefs submitted by the parties in Johnson raised
section 146-6(a). Interestingly, just one year earlier, subsections 146-6(b) and (c) were
discussed in the court's 1970 Carolina Beach opinion. 277 N.C. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517.
Section 146-6(b) vests title to land reclaimed by filling when the purpose of the filling is to
reclaim lands lost to the littoral owner by natural causes. The Carolina Beach court
determined that this subsection was not applicable because the Carolina Beach project
was undertaken for "the preservation and protection of the Town of Carolina Beach from
the fury of the sea rather than the reclamation of the lands of private owners along the
beach." Id.
83. In its opinion, the Johnson court states that "[o]ur position is supported by cases
from other jurisdictions." 278 N.C. at 148, 179 S.E.2d at 385. But, in fact, the cases cited
by the Johnson court not only have nothing to do with inlets but do not even involve the
issue of whether non-riparian land becomes riparian when a waterbody crosses a fixed
boundary. Nor do the cases address the question of whether a riparian parcel that is
completely eroded away may be resurrected by through accretion.
The treatises cited by the Johnson court do provide some support for its
conclusion. For example, HERBERT TIFFANY, 4 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY § 1220 (3d
ed. 1975), discusses whether the doctrine of accretion is a rule of law or a rule of
construction. In the discussion, the promotion rule is viewed as supporting the concept
that the accretion doctrine is a rule of law; whereas the non-promotion rule is consistent
with the view that the doctrine is a rule for the determination of boundaries. Id. From
that one might draw the conclusion that the common law doctrine of accretion is a rule of
construction in North Carolina.
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rule to oceanfront property would be directly contrary to the
language of section 77-20(a).
The only other North Carolina case in which a claim was made
by an owner of lands washed away then subsequently raised is Ward
v. Sunset Beach & Twin Lakes, Inc.8" In Ward, the migration of an
inlet resulted in a number of lots in a barrier island development
completely eroding away. Two of the lost lots were beach lots,
located at the mouth of Tubbs Inlet on the east end of Sunset Beach,
North Carolina.8 6 The lots had been purchased by the plaintiff and
her husband in 1955 and left undeveloped." Over the next twelve
years, the inlet shifted to the west and the entire east end of the
development, including plaintiff's lots, were submerged and eroded
away.88 No attempt was made by plaintiff or her husband to recover
the eroded land, but in 1968 the enterprising original developer of the
area obtained permits to relocate the inlet to the east.89 As part of the
relocation of the inlet, the area between was filled.' After
completing the filling, the configuration of the area was significantly
different than in 1955.91 The developer had the area re-surveyed, and
recorded a new plat map, creating new lots with boundaries different
from the original lots. 2 The new plat also placed streets and roads in
new locations. 93
Later, when the plaintiff discovered what had occurred, she filed
suit asserting both title to the raised land in the area defined by her
deed and easement rights over the area shown as roads in the original
plat.94 The trial court found that the plaintiff owned the lots as
described in her original deed.95 Plaintiff's title to the reclaimed lots
was not predicated on the application of any common law rules, but
on North Carolina General Statute section 146-6(b). The trial court
84. 53 N.C. App. 59, 279 S.E.2d 889 (1981).
85. Id. at 60,279 S.E.2d at 890.
86. Id.; Brunswick County, North Carolina, Office of the Register of Deeds, Map
Book 4 at 64-65, available at http://rodinfo.brunsco.net/ (last visited July 20, 2005) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
87. Ward, 53 N.C. App. at 60,279 S.E.2d at 890.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 60,279 S.E.2d at 891.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 61,279 S.E.2d at 891.
92. Id.; Map Book H at 358, Office of the Register of Deeds, Brunswick County,
North Carolina, available at http://rodinfo.brunsco.net/ (last visited July 20, 2005) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
93. Ward, 53 N.C. App. at 61,279 S.E.2d at 891.
94. Id. at 59-60, 279 S.E.2d at 890.
95. Id. at 62, 279 S.E.2d at 891-92.
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appeared to have found that the filling was done by the defendant to
recover lands lost to the plaintiff.96 In such circumstances, section
146-6(b) vests title in the property owner whose land was reclaimed.97
On appeal, the defendant did not contest the trial court's finding
of fact as to ownership.98 The probable reason for this is that the
reclaimed area in which "her" lots were located was seaward of the
building setback lines, therefore unbuildable,99 and within parts of
four undeveloped lots title to which was still held by the developer."
What the defendant did contest was the plaintiff's claim of an
easement. The plaintiff asserted that her title to the lots included an
easement, in this case the right to use the area shown on the original
plat as Main Street, the street on which her lots fronted."' This
street, of course, no longer existed in that location. But if its location
was superimposed on the new development plat, the street would run
directly through the middle of a number of the new lots, which had
been sold and upon which were very expensive beach homes.1°2 The
defendant argued that the easement, and whatever rights of use the
plaintiff had to Main Street, were lost when the land was washed
away.'013 Unfortunately for the defendant and the title companies
representing the owners of the new lots, the Ward court held that the
plaintiff never abandoned her easement rights and her rights were not
extinguished."~ Once her land was reclaimed she had fee title to that
land, which included her easement appurtenant.105
To the extent that Ward suggests that plaintiff's title to the lots
was not affected by the erosion as the inlet moved across the east end
96. See Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 3, Ward (No. 8013DC757).
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b) (2003) ("If any land is, by act of man, raised
above the high water mark of any navigable water by filling, except such filling be to
reclaim lands theretofore lost to the owner by natural causes or as otherwise provided
under the proviso of subsection (d), title thereto shall vest in the State ... ").
98. The defendant conceded plaintiff's title on the basis that the filling was done to
recover her lost lands and, under such circumstances, section 146-6(b) vested title to the
lots in her. Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 3, Ward (No. 8013DC757).
99. Driveway to Vacant Lots Could Cost $14 Million, CHAPEL HILL NEWSPAPER,
June 25, 1985, at 8B [hereinafter Driveway to Vacant Lots] ("Wards' land is beyond the
island's building line and is good only for dunes and sand crabs.").
100. Record on Appeal at 12, Ward (No. 8013DC757) (detailing the testimony of
surveyor Howard Loughlin).
101. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 2, Ward (No. 8013DC757).
102. Driveway to Vacant Lots, supra note 99 ("The driveway would have to go across
seventy-six other front-row lots, and slice through beach houses costing as much as
$250,000.").
103. Ward v. Sunset Beach & Twin Lakes, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 59, 63, 279 S.E.2d 889,
892 (1981).
104. Id. at 66, 279 S.E.2d at 894.
105. Id.
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of Sunset Beach, that is clearly inconsistent with Carolina Beach and
is wrong. One boundary of plaintiff's lots was the inlet, an
ambulatory boundary. Application of the Carolina Beach principles
leads to the conclusion that when her lots disappeared under the
waters of the inlet so did her title. The "traveling inlet" rule would
have no application to her lots. Even the Johnson court conceded
that a traveling inlet does uproot and supplant a boundary line when
the inlet is in fact the pre-migration boundary.1°6
Assuming that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would still
adhere to this "traveling inlet rule," the rule should only be applicable
to the narrow situation in which there is an inlet, the inlet is not the
boundary between two tracts of land, and the inlet subsequently
passes over the fixed boundary separating the two tracts of land.
However, it would be better to jettison this legal anomaly. The
"traveling inlet" rule is inconsistent with the intent of North Carolina
General Statute sections 77-20(a) and 146-6(a), and the source of
unnecessary potential litigation over areas raised through accretion,
avulsion, or filling. Simple, uniform, bright-line rules are what is
called for in the coastal setting. Even if the land does not start out as
littoral-if through natural processes it abuts the ocean or an inlet-it
should be considered littoral and treated the same as land that always
had an ambulatory water boundary.
IV. ARTIFICIAL ADDITIONS TO THE SHORELINE: THE EFFECT OF
PRIVATE OR PUBLIC BEACH NOURISHMENT OR SAND PLACEMENT
PROJECTS ON TITLE AND LITTORAL RIGHTS
Artificial additions of sand to the shoreline fall within two
general project descriptions. The project may be a sand placement
project,"t 7 which, in most situations, is a one-time placement of sand
106. See State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 148, 179 S.E.2d 371, 385 (1971).
107. Such projects, if funds are available, may be authorized under one of several
different laws. Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1968 authorizes the Unites
States Army Corps of Engineers to take corrective measures for erosion and adjacent
damage to shorelines that result from a federal navigation project. Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1968 § 111 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 426i (2000)). The Corps is also authorized to
place sand dredged from navigational channels and inlets onto adjacent beaches if the
state or one of its political subdivisions pays thirty-five percent of the additional costs of
placing the sand on the beach. See 33 U.S.C. § 426j (2000). Section 1135 of the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 grants the Corps authority to restore habitat if the
habitat is affected by a Corps project. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986
§ 1135 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2309a(c) (2000)). The local sponsor contributes twenty-five
percent of the cost of the project. 33 U.S.C. § 2309a(d). Land, easements, rights-of-way,
and in-kind products and services are counted in the cost-share. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, DIGEST OF WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES, ENGINEER
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along the shoreline,"~ or it may be a full fledged, fifty-year, federal-
state, site-specific, beach nourishment project."° . Since the legal
issues are generally the same for either type of project, the term
"beach project" will be used in this Article to refer to both, except
where a distinction is necessary.
When, as part of a beach project, submerged land is filled and
raised above the mean high tide line, two issues are immediately
presented. First, does the State or the adjacent oceanfront property
owner hold title to the raised submerged land? Second, what effect, if
any, does the filling and rising of submerged land have upon the
littoral rights of the oceanfront property owner?
A. Privately Funded Beach Nourishment Projects
Beach projects are either privately funded or publicly funded.
Privately funded beach nourishment projects face both legal and
practical difficulties. All beach projects involve the filling and raising
of state-owned, submerged public trust land above the mean high
PAMPHLET 1165-2-1 14-1(c) (1999) [hereinafter ENGINEER PAMPHLET], available at
http://www.usace.army.millinetlusace-docs/eng-pamphlets/ep1165-2-1/entire.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
108. The Oak Island Sea Turtle Project, discussed infra notes 171-75 and
accompanying text, was a one-time sand placement. See Christine Bruske, Corps Gives
Turtles a Fighting Chance, ENGINEER UPDATE, Dec. 2001, available at
http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/pubs/decO1/ storyll.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
109. Authorization for site-specific beach nourishment projects is provided by
Congress on a project-by-project basis. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON
BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION
43-45 (1995) [hereinafter BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION] (discussing funding
of beach nourishment). It is not uncommon for people to use the term "beach
nourishment" for sand placement projects. But there are major differences in the two
types of projects. It takes ten to fifteen years of extensive studies to obtain the necessary
federal share of the funding before the first grain of sand is deposited on the shoreline as
part of a fifty-year federal beach nourishment project. See, e.g., PILKEY & DIXON, supra
note 29, at 10-11 (1996) (discussing the process to complete a project). Once the first
nourishment is completed, there will be additional sand replenishment approximately
every five years over the full 50 year cycle of the project. For a detailed description of the
federal beach nourishment process, see, for example, ATLANTIC STATES MARINE
FISHERIES COMM'N, BEACH NOURISHMENT: A REVIEW OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND
PHYSICAL IMPACTS, ASMFC HABITAT MANAGEMENT SERIES No. 7, 70-76 (2002),
available at http://www.asmfc.org/publications/habitat/beachNourishment.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). A sand placement project does not involve the same
extensive pre-project studies and generally is a one-time deposit of sand along the
shoreline. See generally BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, supra, at 60
(distinguishing sand placement from the intensive beach nourishment process). Since the
legal issues presented by either project are the same, the term "beach project" will be used
to describe both in this Article except where a distinction is significant.
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water mark. Neither littoral owners nor anyone else has a common
law right to fill state-owned public trust lands. 110 What right, if any,
that exists is a matter of state legislation. North Carolina statutes
allow oceanfront property owners, after obtaining permission, to fill
and raise such state-owned lands."' If the applicant is seeking to
reclaim lands lost through natural causes, then no state easement is
required.112 But if the applicant is not seeking to reclaim lands lost to
him or her through natural causes, then an easement is required.13
Such an easement will be granted if the Department of
Administration determines that the fill "will not impede navigation or
otherwise interfere with the use of the navigable water by the public
or injure any adjoining ... [littoral] owner" 4 and appropriate
compensation is paid for the easement." 5 Before commencing any
filling, an applicant must also obtain a Coastal Area Management Act
(CAMA) permit."6 The applicable CAMA provisions require that,
before a permit is issued, a finding be made that the filling will not
jeopardize the public's right of access or public trust rights or
interests."7 Finally, since any filling will also be taking place in ocean
waters, which are part of the "navigable waters of the United
110. See generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(7), at 6-51
to -61 (discussing common law, statutory authorizations, and history of regulation of filling
of submerged lands in navigable waters).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(c) (2003).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) requires a permit
for any development in areas of environmental concern. Id. § 113A-118(a) (2003). Ocean
and estuarine beaches are areas of environmental concern. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
7H.0201 (Aug. 2000) (listing estuarine and ocean systems categories), available at
http://www.nccoastal management.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_.07h.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); id. r. 7h.0207 (Oct. 1993) (stating that ocean submerged lands
seaward of mean high water mark are public trust areas).
117. In North Carolina, the dry sand beach and the area seaward of the mean high
water mark are "areas of environmental concern." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-
113(b)(5)-(6); see also N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0201 (Aug. 2000) (listing
estuarine and ocean systems categories); id. r. 7H.0207 (Oct. 1993) (stating that ocean
submerged lands seaward of mean high water mark are public trust areas). The applicable
standards for permits for a major development in such an area of environmental concern
(an AEC) which would include filling and raising of public trust submerged lands above
the mean high water mark, require that the application for the permit be denied if "the
development will jeopardize" public rights or interests, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-
120(a)(5), or "is inconsistent with ... [CAMA] guidelines or local land use plans," id.
§ 113A-120(a)(8). See also N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0208(b)(8) (May 1996)
(listing beach nourishment standards); id. r. 7H.0308(a) (Aug. 2002) (listing criteria for
ocean shoreline erosion control activities.
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States,"'t8 a permit must be obtained from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers,"' a process that requires that the Corps conduct an
extensive public interest review.120 Satisfaction of the various permit
conditions is the first impediment faced by a private beach project.
The second is the costs, both legal and otherwise, of the project itself.
Beach projects generally require costly and extensive engineering and
environmental studies in addition to the costs of the actual filling.12 1
It is probably the costs of the project more than the legal hurdles that
discourage privately funded projects and lead to the demand for
publicly funded beach projects.
When such privately funded projects are permitted,122 the filling
and raising of submerged lands has no effect on the title or the littoral
118. 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2004) (defining "[n]avigable waters of the United States" to
include waters subject to ebb and flow of tide); see also id. § 329.12 (stating that navigable
waters of the United States includes ocean and coastal waters). Section 502(7) of the
Clean Water Act defines "navigable waters" to include the territorial seas. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7) (2000).
119. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 makes it
unlawful to excavate or fill any navigable water of the United States except when
authorized by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. § 403. Section 301
of the Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into waters of the United
States, which includes the territorial seas. See id. §§ 1311, 1362(7). Section 404(a) grants
the Corps the authority to issue permits for the discharge of dredge or fill material into
navigable waters. See id. § 1344.
120. The general policies for the issuance of Corps permits, including the public
interest review, can be found at 33 C.F.R. § 320.4.
121. Although the cost per mile varies with each project, illustrative are a series of
long-term beach projects that were under construction or being studied in 2001.
Brunswick County (Oak Island, Casewell, Ocean Isle, and Holden Beach): twenty-three
miles of beach at a cost of $201 million over thirty years; Topsail Island (study of fifty-year
plan): 22.7 miles of beach at a cost of $235 million; Bogue Banks (study of a fifty-year
plan): seventeen miles of beach from Pine Knoll Shores to Emerald Isle at a cost of $289
million. See Frank Tursi, Call of the Beach, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 11, 2001, at Al. A
fifty-year project recommended by the Army Corps of Engineers to pump sand on the
beaches in Kitty Hawk, Kill Devil Hills, and Nags Head would cost $910 million, or about
$1.3 million a mile each year. Id. This project when adjusted for 50 years of inflation
jumps to $1.6 billion. Id. The one time, two mile turtle habitat beach nourishment project
on Oak Island in 2001 cost $11.4 million. Jerry Allegood, Fortifying a Nursery for Island's
Sea Turtles, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 28, 2001, at 1A. The expected life
of this project is ten to fifteen years. Bruske, supra note 108. This is the project that
generated the Slavin litigation. See infra Part IV.B.3.
122. For example, Figure Eight Island has a private bridge out to the island that the
public is not allowed to use. Brian Feagans, As Seas Rise, N.C. Islanders Face Simple
Choice: Retreat or Renourish, SUNDAY STAR NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.), Jan. 2, 2000, at
1A. As a result, Figure Eight Island does not qualify for taxpayer money to fund beach
renourishment projects. Id. The residents raised eight million dollars of their own money
to fund nourishment projects, and the island has been allowed to pump modest amounts of
sand from nearby channels, inlets, and spoil islands, but beach quality sand has been hard
to find. Id.
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rights of the oceanfront property owner. Under the applicable North
Carolina statute, the oceanfront property owner would hold title to
the newly raised shore to the mean high water mark.13 Such title, as
all private titles to the dry sand beach, remain subject to public trust
rights.24 Since the oceanfront owner would have title to the water's
edge, exactly as before the beach nourishment, the project would
have no effect on any littoral rights that previously existed.
B. Publicly Funded Beach Projects
1. Public Use and Title
The bulk of the funds for most public beach projects is federal."z
Whether public access to the nourished beach is a requirement for
federal financial participation depends on the project's classification.
If it is the typical long-term project, the primary purpose of which is
the reduction of hurricane and storm damage to shore development
and coastal resources,126 the nourished beach must be open to public
use. 27 These federal requirements do not mandate public ownership
of the replenished beach--only that it be open to the public. But
123. Section 146-6 addresses the title questions that would arise in most beach
nourishment projects. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b) (2003). If the purpose of the
project is to reclaim lands lost to the applicant as the result of natural causes, then title to
the raised land is vested in the applicant. If the project is not for that purpose, title is still
vested in the applicant if the land was raised under permits issued to a private person
pursuant to sections 113-229 and 113A-100 to -128. The latter North Carolina permitting
statutes cover most of, if not all, of the circumstances in which a privately funded beach
nourishment project would be authorized.
124. Id. § 146-6(f) ("All such raised lands shall remain open to the free use and
enjoyment of the people of the State, consistent with the public trust rights in ocean
beaches .... ).
125. See Stradling, supra note 8 ("Local, state and federal taxpayers split the bill for
nourishment projects, with the federal government paying about half the cost of the
studies and about two-thirds the cost of construction.").
126. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FINAL REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS SHORE PROTECrION PROGRAM, IWR Report 96-PS-
1, at 111-24-25 (1996) ("The enactment of WRDA '86 [Water Resources Development Act
of 19861 established hurricane and storm damage reduction (HSDR) and recreation as the
basis for Federal participation, and the only two purposes for which Federal shore
protection projects could be formulated."), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/
iwr/pdf96psl.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
127. As a general matter, federal funds may not be used to nourish privately-owned
and used shorelines. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986, as amended in
1999, in a section titled "Benefits to privately owned shores," provides that "[a~ll costs
assigned to benefits of periodic nourishment projects or measures to privately owned
shores (where use of such shores is limited to private interests) or to prevention of losses
of private land shall be borne by the non-Federal interest." 33 U.S.C. § 2213(d)(2)(B)
(2000); see also ENGINEER PAMPHLET, supra note 107, 1 14-1(c)(2)(a)-(b).
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North Carolina General Statute section 146-6(f) provides that "the
title to land in or immediately along the Atlantic Ocean raised above
the mean high water mark by publicly financed projects which involve
hydraulic dredging or other deposition of spoil materials or sand vests
in the state."'" Therefore, if the nourishment is publicly funded and
involves raising ocean submerged lands, then the state, not the
oceanfront property owner, holds title to the nourished beach.
On the other hand, if the federally funded beach project is part
of a federal corrective and mitigation project, federal law does not
require that the restored beach be open to use by the public. This is
one of the rare instances in which federal funds will be expended to
place sand on privately owned and controlled beaches. If erosion is
caused by artificially created conditions, the oceanfront property
owner has a common law claim for damages against the person
responsible for the condition.129 Although the federal navigation
servitude protects the federal government from liability for some of
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (emphasis added). CAMA regulations applicable to
beach nourishment projects go even further. The regulations condition state involvement
in beach projects. The applicable regulations require that "[t]he entire restored portion of
the beach shall be in permanent public ownership." N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
7M.0202(d)(1) (May 1995) (emphasis added), available at http://www.nccoastal
management.net/Rules/Text/tl5a-07m.0200.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). However, some local governments may only be requiring oceanfront property
owners to execute documents that convey an easement to the local entity for public use of
the replenished beach. In one document, it appeared that oceanfront property attempted
to create an easement that was revocable if the beach was not replenished on a regular,
continuing basis. The document is entitled "Perpetual Easement For Beach
Renourishment," and executed in connection with a beach nourishment project on the
beaches of the Town of Kure Beach, North Carolina. Typed on the document, by the
oceanfront property owner executing it, are the following words:
This easement shall expire six years from the date the execution was
acknowledged before a Notary Public unless the grantee its successors and assigns
have engaged in the deposit of sand on the easement as part of the above
referenced "Carolina Beach and Vicinity Area South, Hurricane, wave, and Shore
Protection Project" and shall expire automatically if there is any six year period in
which sand is not deposited as part of this project or a comparable project
sponsored in whole or in part by the Town of Kure Beach.
Kalo, supra note 6, at 1891 n.98 (quoting Perpetual Easement For Beach Renourishment,
New Hanover County, N.C., Dec. 30, 1995). Such easements, however broad or limited,
are inconsistent with the clear directive of section 146-6(f) and the applicable CAMA
regulation that title to replenished beaches is in the state, and become public trust lands.
Failure to make this clear to oceanfront property owners only causes confusion as to the
extent of public rights to the beach and may be the source of unnecessary future litigation.
129. See, e.g., Lummis v. Lilly, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-50 (Mass. 1982) (upholding a
claim for shoreline damage caused by a neighboring stone groin on the theory that the
appropriateness of the use of shoreline protection measures depends on whether it is a
"reasonable use" by the owner of the groin).
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the adverse consequences of its navigation projects, under existing
case law the federal government arguably is liable for increased beach
erosion caused by federal navigation structures.13 ° Thus, the federal
mitigation project is a form of compensation to the affected
oceanfront property owner. But, the language of section 146-6(f)
draws no distinction between types of beach projects. The crucial
factor is the presence of public financing. If any public funds are
used, then the raised land is state-owned.' But, if the federal project
was compensatory in nature, the presence of public funds should have
no effect on the oceanfront property owner's claim of title to the
raised land. The "public funds" are really a form of compensation to
the oceanfront property owner who suffered the adverse effects of a
particular federal navigation project. Consequently, this situation
should be treated the same as section 146-6(f) treats a directly
privately funded beach project.13 2
Interestingly, shoreline additions to inlet front property are
treated differently than those along the Atlantic Ocean. If the beach
project involves the placement of material along inlet shorelines, then
sections 146-6(b) and 146-6(d)-and not section 146-6(f)-are the
relevant provisions.133 When additions are to inlet shorelines, the
130. In Applegate v. United States, the United States Court of Federal Claims held that
oceanfront property owners, who alleged in their complaint that federal navigation
structures interfered with the natural movement of sand in the adjacent ocean littoral
currents and thereby increased the rate of erosion of their oceanfront property, stated a
legally cognizable claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 35 Fed. Cl. 406, 410-11, 425
(Fed Cl. 1996).
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2003).
132. If the federal government is liable for the loss of the land by reason of the action
of federal navigation structures, and the filling is being done, as it would be in such a
compensatory project, to "reclaim lands theretofore lost to the owner by natural causes or
otherwise," id. § 146-6(b) (emphasis added), then title to the sand placed on the beach by
the federal government should be in the oceanfront property owner. In reality, when the
project is compensatory in nature, the federal government is acting on behalf of the
oceanfront property owner. If the State claims title to the raised land, then the State is
physically taking land belonging to the oceanfront property owner in violation of both the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the
Constitution of the State of North Carolina. What the measure of damages should be may
be debatable. The cost of the project is some measure of the loss sustained by the
oceanfront property owner; but, since all dry sand beaches are open to public use, part of
the cost of the project is compensation to the public for the loss of the dry sand beach.
However, that does not mean that the oceanfront property owner sustains no loss. Even
though title to a dry sand beach is always encumbered by public trust rights, the lack of
title to a nourished beach means the oceanfront property owner is no longer a common
law littoral owner. What rights the oceanfront owner now possess are a matter of statute
not common law.
133. Section 146-6(f) applies only to land "in or immediately along the Atlantic
Ocean." Id. § 146-6(f). See also Advisory Opinion, supra note 48 (stating subsection 146-
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presence or absence of public funding is not the critical factor in
determining whether title vests in the state. Under section 146-6(b)
the critical factor is whether the purpose of the project was to recover
lands lost to the owner. 134  If it is, title remains in the inlet front
owner; if not, then subject to one exception discussed below,135 title to
the raised land is in the state. In the context of a publicly funded
beach project, recovery of lands lost to inlet front property owners is
not one of the purposes. Instead, the purposes are to provide
hurricane and storm protection to upland areas and to restore the
recreational beach. 3 6 Therefore, as a practical matter, section 146-
6(b)'s treatment of publicly funded inlet beach projects is the same as
section 146-6(f). 37 The exception is contained in section 146-6(d).
Under section 146-6(d), the source of the material is determinative,
not the source of funding or the purpose of the project. 138  If the
raising of submerged land involves any deposit of dredge material
excavated for the purpose of deepening a harbor or inland waterway,
or clearing out or creating the same, on privately-owned land, then
the material deposited belongs to the owner of the land upon which it
was deposited and not the state.'39
6(f) is inapplicable because inlet channel shoreline is not" 'immediately along the Atlantic
Ocean' ") (internal citation omitted).
134. The section states: "If any land is, by act of man, raised above the high watermark
of any navigable water by filling, except such filling be to reclaim lands theretofore lost to
the owner by natural causes, ... title thereto shall vest in the State ...." Id. § 146-6(b)
(emphasis added).
135. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
137. See infra note 224.
138. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 48. Section 146-6(d) is not applicable to lands
in or along the Atlantic Ocean because section 146-6(f) applies to such lands
"[n]otwithstanding the other provisions of [section 146]." § 146-6(f).
139. The statute provides, in part:
[I]f in any process of dredging, by either the State or federal government, for the
purpose of deepening any harbor or inland waterway, or clearing out or creating
the same, a deposit of the excavated material is made upon the lands of any owner,
and title to which at the time is not vested in either the State or federal
government, or any other person.... all such additions to lands shall accrue to the
use and benefit of the owner or owners of the land or lands on which such deposit
shall have been made, and such owner or owners shall be deemed vested in fee
simple with the title to the same.
§ 146-6(d). If the deposit of the material was not dredge material, but sand obtained from
other sources or from other purposes, then section 146-6(d) would not apply. The
applicable provision would be section 146-6(b). This section provides that, unless the
purpose of the filling is to recover lands lost to the owner by natural causes, title to the
raised land vests in the state. Whether the project is publicly or privately funded is not a
relevant factor. Id. § 146-6(b). The purpose of the filling is the determining factor. See id.
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2. Beach Projects and the Loss of Littoral Rights
If title to a publicly nourished beach lies in the state or other
public authority, then what effect does that have upon the common
law littoral rights of the oceanfront property owner? If after the
project the property's direct contact with ocean waters is lost, then
the owner of this "oceanfront property" no longer has any common
law littoral rights.140 Unless-as part of the beach project-the
oceanfront property owner has ceded her littoral rights, those rights
have been replaced by equivalent statutory rights, or the existence of
those rights was inherently contingent upon the adjacent submerged
lands remaining unfilled, the oceanfront property owner may be
entitled to compensation for the loss.
Realistically, in most situations in which a beach is seriously
eroded or eroding, faced with the choice of either giving up common
law littoral rights or not having a beach project for the protection of
oceanfront structures, most oceanfront property owners will make the
necessary concessions.14 1 The beach project will have little adverse
effect on their customary use of the shore. After most beach projects,
oceanfront property owners will still be able to walk down to the
beach and into ocean waters, to lie on the dry sand, or to sit on a deck
or at a window and watch the waves move toward the shore. Even
when an oceanfront property owner refuses to make the necessary
concessions, if the project has no significant impact on their use of
their property or the shore, there may be a technical taking of littoral
rights, but the taking would have little practical effect and any
compensation due would not seem substantial. It is only when a
project does adversely impact oceanfront property owners and littoral
The fact that project was publicly funded, however, would still be relevant to whether
federal regulations mandate that there be public access to the raised lands. See id.
Section 146-6(d) is not applicable to oceanfront beach projects. Section 146-6(d)
was included in section 146 as part of the revision of the North Carolina General Statutes.
Act of June 2, 1959, ch. 683, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 612, 615 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 146-6(d) (2003)). Section 146-6(f), which addresses all publicly funded oceanfront beach
projects, however, was enacted by the legislation in 1985. Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 276,
1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 226, 226-27 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2003)). To the
extent there is a conflict between sections 146-6(d) and (f), as the later enactment, section
146-6(f) is controlling. See, e.g., In re Guess, 324 N.C. 105, 107, 376 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989)
(holding where irreconcilable conflict exists, the later statute generally controls).
140. To have common law littoral rights, one boundary of the subject land must be the
ocean or an inlet. By statute, the State could grant littoral rights to non-littoral owners
and has done so in the past in connection with a beach nourishment project. See infra
notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
141. Although one does occasionally hear stories about property owners holding out
and refusing to execute documents necessary for a project.
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rights are not voluntarily relinquished that a serious issue arises as to
whether the oceanfront property owner has lost any littoral rights for
which compensation must be paid.
a. Does North Carolina General Statutes Section 146-1(d)
Preserve Existing Littoral Rights?
It is true that section 146-6(f) of the General Statutes of North
Carolina places the title to a beach created by a publicly funded beach
nourishment project in the state, subject to public trust use rights;142
however, section 146-6(f) does not address the consequences of such
filling on the oceanfront property owner's littoral rights. But, section
146-6(f) is found in "Subchapter I: Unallocated State Lands." The
first section of that subchapter, section 146-1--entitled "Intent of
Subchapter"-provides in part (d): "[n]othing in this Subchapter
shall be construed to limit or expand the full exercise of common law
riparian or littoral rights.' 1 43  Therefore an appropriate construction
of section 146-6(f) is that, although it grants title to raised lands to the
state, the statute is not intended to impair pre-existing littoral
rights. an
Part (d) of section 146-1 was added in 1995 as part of legislation,
the major purpose of which was to address the use and occupancy of
submerged lands by marinas and other private facilities and
structures. 145  There is no indication that the General Assembly
142. The statute states, in pertinent part:
[T]itle to land in or immediately along the Atlantic Ocean raised above the mean
high water mark by publicly financed projects which involve hydraulic dredging or
other deposition of spoil materials or sand vests in the State .... All such raised
lands shall remain open to the free use and enjoyment of the people of the State,
consistent with the public trust rights in ocean beaches ....
§ 146-6(f).
143. Id. § 146-1(d).
144. The point being asserted is equally applicable to section 146-6(b) when submerged
land along an inlet shoreline is filled and the claim is made that the State both holds title
to the raised land and the littoral rights of the former inlet front property owners are
terminated.
145. Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 529, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1917, 1918 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 146-1(d) (2003)). This legislation added subsections to sections 146-1 and
146-12 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Id. at 1918-22 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 146-1 to -12 (2003)). The major purpose of the amendments was to provide a
legislative response to the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Walker v. N.C.
Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Res., which held that an easement from the Department
of Administration was required for the construction of a commercial marina over public
trust waters. 111 N.C. App. 851, 852, 433 S.E.2d 767, 767 (1993). The amended section
146-12 provides detailed provisions governing the issuance of easements for structures
located over state public trust waters. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-12.
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considered its potential application to section 146-6(f), which was
added to the General Statutes in 1985.146 However, section 146-1(d)'s
unambiguous language applies to all of subchapter I, and reading
sections 146-1(d) and 146-6(f) together 147 would be consistent with the
General Assembly's historical practice in dealing with beach
nourishment projects. This historical practice shows a legislative
recognition that a public beach nourishment could terminate common
law littoral rights and generate claims by oceanfront property owners
for compensation based on a taking of private property rights. To
avoid this issue, in the legislative authorization of early beach
projects, the General Assembly statutorily preserved the littoral
rights of the oceanfront property owners.148
The very first beach nourishment project in North Carolina took
place at Wrightsville Beach in 1939.149 Since the planned beach
nourishment project would involve the filling of state-owned
submerged lands by the Town of Wrightsville Beach and raising them
above the mean high water mark, legislation was needed to authorize
the filling and determine title to the raised land. Under this special
legislation, title to the raised land would be in the town, but the use of
the raised land would be limited to "development and uses as a public
square or park."'50 In addition the legislation addressed the status of
the oceanfront property owners' littoral rights, "which will be
destroyed or taken by and through the making of such new made
lands."'' According to the session law, "owners of the property
abutting on said newly made or constructed land, shall, in front of
146. Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 276, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 226, 226-27 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2003)). Amended section 146-1, in subsection (b), contains a
detailed statement of the justification for allowing private and public piers, docks,
wharves, marinas, and other structures to be built in and over state-owned public trust
submerged lands and waters. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-1(b).
147. Section 146-1(d) would be equally applicable to section 146-6(b).
148. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
149. See Duke University Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines, The U.S.
Beach Nourishment Experience, at http://www.env.duke.edu/psds/Nourishment/NC.xls
(last visited Aug. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Duke University Study] (including eleven years of
ongoing research and data collection, this study lists the Wrightsville Beach Nourishment
project of 1939 as the first beach nourishment project in North Carolina) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Some might say the very first nourishment project was the
massive rebuilding of the Outer Banks that started in 1937. Sarah F. Tebbens et al.,
Wavelet Analysis of Shoreline Change on the Outer Banks of North Carolina: An Example
of Complexity in the Marine Sciences, PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SC. OF THE U.S.A.,
Feb. 19, 2002, at 2554, available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender
.fcgi?artid=128575 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
150. Act of Mar. 30, 1939, ch. 246, § 1, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 508.
151. Id. pmbl. at 509 (emphasis added).
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their said property, possess and keep their rights, as if littoral owners,
in the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, bordering on said newly acquired
and constructed land.""15 Thus, in this very first project, the General
Assembly, concerned that the raising of submerged lands would have
the effect of destroying or taking the common law littoral rights of the
oceanfront property owners, decided to grant the former oceanfront
property owners substitute statutory littoral rights over the newly
raised lands.
The next major beach nourishment project occurred at Carolina
Beach in 1965.153 Using language identical to that contained in the
152. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
153. See Duke University Study, supra note 149 (listing all North Carolina beach
projects during the period of 1939-2004). A sister project was commenced at Wrightsville
Beach at the same time as the Carolina Beach project. Id. Wrightsville Beach and
Carolina Beach are two of the most replenished beaches in the United States. PILKEY &
DIXON, supra note 29, at 88.
In 1959 the General Assembly enacted section 146-6(b), governing title to land
raised above navigable waters. Act of June 2, 1959, ch. 683, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 612, 614
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b) (2003)). This section, in part, provides that "[ilf any
land is, by act of man, raised above the high watermark of any navigable water by filling,
except such filling to be to reclaim land theretofore lost the owner by natural causes ... ,
title thereto shall vest in the State . N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b) (2003). The effect of
this language was an issue in Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach,
which was litigation involving the Carolina Beach project. 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513
(1970).
By the early 1960s, a large part of the shoreline in the Town of Carolina Beach
had suffered severe erosion. Id. at 298-99, 177 S.E.2d at 514. So severe was the erosion
that the Carolina Beach plaintiffs ocean front lots had completely eroded away. Id. The
erosion forces of the wind and waves had eaten away the shoreline and gradually moved
the mean high tide line across plaintiff's lots to the public road running behind them. Id.
at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 517. After the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers pumped sand along the
shoreline, rebuilding the beach, the plaintiff claimed he was the owner of the newly
created dry sand beach in the same location as his eroded away lots. Id. at 298-99, 177
S.E.2d at 514.
Applying traditional common law principles applicable to littoral property
owners, the court concluded that plaintiff's title to the area was lost as the forces of
erosion moved the high tide line across his land. Id. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517. The forces
of nature transformed former privately-owned uplands into state-owned submerged lands.
And, when the mean high tide line moved across the rear boundary of plaintiffs lots, he
lost all title to the area. Id.
The plaintiff, however, contended that, after the filling, section 146-6(b) vested
title to the raised land in him. Id. Focusing on the exception in section 146-6(b), the court
concluded that, since the purpose of the project was to protect the town from storm
damage and not to reclaim lands lost to the plaintiff, the statute vested title in the State
and not the plaintiff. Id. Even in the absence of section 146-6, title to the raised land
would not have been in the plaintiff. Id. Plaintiffs lots had completely eroded away.
Under the traditional common law rule followed in a majority of jurisdictions,
absent a state statute to the contrary, once a littoral owner's land has completely eroded
away and the mean high tide line has moved onto the next property owner's land, that
property owner is promoted to the status of a littoral owner with all the rights associated
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1939 Wrightsville Beach statute, the General Assembly, in the 1963
statute applicable to the Carolina Beach project, stated once again
"that the owners of the property abutting on said newly made or
constructed land, shall, in front of their said property possess and
keep their rights, as if littoral owners, in the waters of the Atlantic
Ocean, bordering on said newly acquired and constructed lands."'54
Once again, recognition of the potential adverse impact of a public
beach nourishment project led the General Assembly expressly to
substitute statutory littoral rights for the common law littoral rights
about to be extinguished.
When the General Assembly added section 146-6(f) to the
General Statutes, it did so against this existing historical background.
Nothing in section 146-6(f) speaks directly to the impact of the
publicly funded nourishment project upon an oceanfront property
owner's littoral rights. Its effect is limited to determination of
questions of title to a nourished beach. Therefore, even though
section 146-6(f) places title to the raised land in the state, section 146-
1(d) makes it clear that the change of title does not, in and of itself,
affect existing common law littoral rights.'55 However, unlike the
earlier 1939 and 1963 legislation, section 146-1(d) does not expressly
substitute statutory littoral rights for all common law littoral rights
lost as the result of a beach nourishment project; its effect is more
limited.
b. State's Right To Terminate Littoral Rights by Filling
Adjacent Submerged Lands
The import of section 146-1(d) is simply that nothing in the
subchapter, including section 146-6(f), shall limit or expand existing
littoral rights. It does not answer the question as to whether, under
the common law, existing littoral rights are subject to the inherent
qualification that such rights may be extinguished or limited by the
with that status. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. Any accretions to the land
would adhere to the benefit of the promoted littoral owner and not to the former littoral
owner. Therefore, if anyone had a common law claim to the raised land it would not have
been the Carolina Beach plaintiff. It would have been the owner of the road, which would
appear to be the town.
The effect of the project on plaintiff's littoral rights was never at issue and would
never have been in issue. They were not at issue because littoral rights presupposes
ownership of littoral property. And even if the court had concluded that plaintiff had title
to the raised land, the General Assembly, as it had in the Wrightsville Beach situation,
specifically addressed the effect upon littoral rights of the Carolina Beach project. See
infra note 154 and accompanying text.
154. Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 511, § 1, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 609,610 (emphasis added).
155. See § 146-1(d).
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State by the act of filling and raising adjacent state-owned submerged
lands. This issue will be examined next in the context of the specific
littoral rights of access and view.
c. Impairment of the Rights of Access and View
Two valuable characteristics of oceanfront property are that the
property owners have direct access from their land to ocean waters
and they have an unobstructed view of scenic ocean waters. 56 One or
both of these features may be jeopardized by a beach project. To
protect the newly constructed dune, the vegetation planted to
stabilize it, and the habitat created following a beach project,
regulations may be promulgated that prohibit oceanfront property
owners from crossing the dunes in front of their homes to reach the
ocean.'57 No longer able to walk directly out to the beach and ocean
waters, the oceanfront property owners instead must walk or drive
down a coastal road to one of the designated public beach access
paths or walks located at spaced distances along the coastline to reach
the beach.'58 And, the dunes created may be so high that, instead of a
panoramic ocean view from a living room picture window, the only
view is of a wall of sand.159 Or, the State or Town, as title holder to
the raised lands, might decide to place buildings or other structures
upon the raised lands which interfere with both the oceanfront
156. The reason the context of the discussion is limited to the right of access and the
right of view is that these are the two aspects of oceanfront property ownership that are
most likely to be of concern to oceanfront property owners following a beach project, as is
demonstrated by the litigated cases discussed in this Article.
Assertion of the state's title to the raised lands also involves a termination of the
oceanfront property owner's littoral right to accretions. But, when a beach is seriously
eroding, protective dunes have been destroyed, and the waves are pounding near the
foundation of oceanfront homes or against a temporary sandbag protective seawall, one
would assume that most affected oceanfront property owners would gladly trade their
littoral right to accretions for the protection of a nourished beach. Absent such
protection, continued loss of shoreline could result in the total loss of an oceanfront lot
and all littoral rights. It is after the completion of the project-when the oceanfront
property owner discovers that her customary direct access to the beach has been
terminated or that her right of view is being destroyed-that the impact of the project on
her littoral rights is first fully appreciated. If direct access to the beach is still present and
there is no impairment of view, her littoral rights have still been terminated as a result of
the project, but the taking has little practical effect and any compensation due would
probably not be substantial.
157. See Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 58-59, 584 S.E.2d 100, 101
(2003).
158. See id. at 59, 584 S.E.2d at 101.
159. See City of Ocean City v. Maffucci, 740 A.2d 630, 632 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) (noting the defendants' view was completely obstructed by man-made dune and
planted dune grasses).
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property owner's access to, and view of, the water."6° In these
situations, the property owner may assert that the project has resulted
in a taking of valuable littoral rights for which the property owner is
entitled to compensation.
3. Cutting Off the Right of Access: Slavin v. Town of Oak Island
Slavin v. Town of Oak Island,'161 a recent North Carolina case, is
an excellent illustration of the denial of direct access to ocean
waters. 161  During the summer of 1999, Hurricane Floyd caused
tremendous beach erosion along the shoreline of Oak Island, North
Carolina, destroying the dunes that protected oceanfront homes.163
Forty-five oceanfront homes were destroyed and 430 were
damaged," 4 and after the storm Atlantic waters lapped at the footings
of many others. 165 A beach project was desperately needed.166 But,
beach nourishment projects take time, and sand was needed quickly
in case another storm developed and caused even greater property
damage and devastation. As it turned out, two circumstances
combined to provide an avenue for an accelerated sand placement
project. The first was that the United States Army Corps of
Engineers was about to engage in a major dredging project: the
"Wilmington Harbor Project.' ' 67  The project was to dredge the
channel of the mouth of and the entrance to the Cape Fear River and
the Corps needed a disposal site for that sand."M The plan was to
160. See Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 136 N.E. 224,224-25 (N.Y. 1922).
161. 160 N.C. App. 57, 584 S.E.2d 100 (2003).
162. Id. at 59, 584 S.E.2d at 101 (noting plaintiffs' direct access to beach was limited to
specific access points); see also Maffucci, 740 A.2d at 632 (noting the defendants' beach
access was only by pathway 80 feet north of condominium).
163. Frank Tursi, Call of the Beach: Not All Agree That Millions in Rebuilding Is the
Way to Go, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 11, 2001, at Al.
164. Id.
165. Id. ("The hurricane destroyed 45 first-row houses and damaged 430 of the town's
500 oceanfront buildings, giving Oak Island the distinction after the storm of having the
highest concentration of erosion threatened buildings on the coast.").
166. See James Eli Shiffer, High Tide Leaves Little Beach in Many Beach Towns, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 2, 2000, at IA. ("Altman [the mayor of Oak Island]
has made a plea for more sand before politicians in Raleigh and Washington and anyone
else who will listen. On many stretches of the Brunswick County island, the strand
disappears at high tide.").
167. See Cape Fear Harbor Project: Long-awaited Dredging Effort to Start in April,
MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Feb. 23, 2000, at 2B (discussing that the Wilmington
Harbor Project would begin dredging in April of 2000, only seven months after Hurricane
Floyd hit in September of 1999).
168. See Wilmington Harbor Sand Management Plan: Ocean Entrance Channels and
Inner Harbor Between Lower Swash and Reaves Point 3, at http://nc-es.fws.gov/pubs/fwca/
Wilmington/AppD-sand.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2005) ("With the capacity of the
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place part of the sand on portions of the eastern and western shores
of Oak Island, with other communities receiving the remainder. 69
That project began in December 2000 and was completed two years
later.7 °
The second was the Oak Island Turtle Habitat project. The
dunes on Oak Island, like many of the barrier islands along the
Carolina coast, provided nesting habitat for sea turtles.17' Much of
that important dune structure had been lost as a result of storms over
the past twenty years.'72 But under section 1135 of the federal Water
Resources Development Act of 1986, funds were available which
could be used for the purpose of restoring sea turtle habitat.'73 The
project would place sand dredged from the Atlantic Intracoastal
Waterway along approximately 9,000 feet of Oak Island shoreline.'74
In September 2000, the turtle habitat project commenced.'75
Both projects entailed the placement of sand seaward of the
mean high tide line, leaving a narrow depression of submerged land
between the landward boundary of the projects and the mean high
tide line. 7 6 The placement of sand moved the mean high tide line
existing ODMDS [offshore dredge material disposal sites] insufficient to accommodate the
dredged material disposal volume requirements through 2001, the logical solution is to
place the 4.8 million cubic yards of beach quality material on adjacent beaches.") (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
169. 7.5.12 Oak Island, Beach Nourishment at http://www.saw.usace.army.mil/wet
lands/Projects/Boguelnlet/DEIS All/App%20F%20CEAIApp%20F%20pages%2017-
30.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter 7.5.12 Oak Island] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
170. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 2, Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App.
57, 584 S.E.2d 100 (2003) (No. COA 02-671) (discussing that the project began in
December of 2000); 7.5.12 Oak Island, supra note 169.
171. See Bruske, supra note 108.
172. See Penny Schmitt, Sand-on-the-Beach Season Opens with Turtle Habitat Project,
WILMINGTON DISTRICT NEWS, Feb. 2001, at 1 ("Over the past [twenty] years, erosion of
the island's dune field has eaten away virtually all the suitable nesting habitat for the
turtles.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at
http://www.saw.usace.army.millPAO/District%20Newsletters/2001/febnewsOlPNG.PDF.
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
173. See id. at 3. The Oak Island project was the first beach anywhere nourished by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under the category of habitat restoration. Orrin H. Pilkey
& Andrew S. Coburn, Throwing Dollars at Beaches: Beach Nourishment Uses Public
Money To Save Homes of the Wealthy, CHARLOTE OBSERVER, Sept. 23,2001, at 6D.
174. Schmitt, supra note 172, at 1, 3. The project cost $11.3 million, with the federal
government contributing $5 million and the balance contributed by the State of North
Carolina and the local sponsors. Id. at 1. Two-point-six million cubic yards of sand was
placed on the beach, adding seventy feet to the width of the beach. Id. at 1, 3. The project
has an estimated life span of ten to fifteen years. Bruske, supra note 108.
175. Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 2, Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57,
584 S.E.2d 100 (2003) (No. COA 02-671).
176. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 5, Slavin (No. COA 02-671).
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seaward, creating a new dry sand beach and dune between the former
mean high tide line and the new one. According to the plan,
eventually the narrow depression would also fill in with sand as wind
and other natural processes moved sand into this depression, leaving
one continuous strand of beach. 17
The reason for the particular placement of the sand was that
placement landward of the original mean high tide line would have
required the granting of easements for that purpose by all the
affected oceanfront property owners. 178  Absent the voluntary
granting of the necessary easements, the town 179 would have to
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire them. In addition,
even voluntary grants of easements take time to acquire and this
project was on a fast-track. 8 ° Placement of sand seaward of the mean
high tide line, however, did not require any private easements
because the submerged land lying seaward of that line was state
public trust submerged lands. 1'
Since one major stated objective of the Sea Turtle Project was
protection of turtle habitat, the project agreement required the town
177. It did not work completely according to plan, however. High-tide waters
breached the dune in June 2001, leaving "puddles as long as football fields and as wide as
about 25 feet in some places." Lee Holland, Oak Island Fills Beach Trench: Sand Dollars
Drained, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), June 21, 2001, at 1A. The initial filling of
the trench in 2001 cost the town more than $283,000. Id. But, that did not solve the
problem. In 2003, the town spent an additional $225,000 to dump an additional 25,000
cubic feet of sand on the 1.6 mile span of beach. Millard K. Ives, Oak Island Restarts Sand
Operation to Fill in Ditches Left by Turtle Project, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.),
Apr. 2, 2003, at 2B. One study attributed the cause of the ditch to "poor design" of the
project. Id.
178. Title to the beach landward of the mean high water mark was in the adjacent
oceanfront owners and, absent an easement, the placement of sand landward of the mean
high water mark would be a trespass. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 6, Slavin (No. COA
02-671) (town thought it could avoid legal necessity of obtaining "sand replacement
easements").
179. The Town of Oak Island was the project sponsor. Under applicable Corps'
regulations, the local sponsor is responsible for obtaining all necessary easements.
ENGINEER PAMPHLET, supra note 107, 15-3(c).
180. Discussions between the town and the Corps about restoration of sea turtle
habitat started in 1992. Allegood, supra note 121. But the effects of Hurricane Floyd led
the town to urge the Corps to actually undertake the project. Oak Island: Owners Lose
Suit Over Path to Beach, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Aug. 20, 2003 at lB. In
September 2000, the town and Corps entered into the project contract. Army Corps of
Engineers to Build Up Oak Island Turtle Nesting Habitat, A.P., Sept. 28, 2000. Although
the project commenced in September 2000, the actual placement of sand on the shore did
not start until February 2001 and was completed in April. Allegood, supra note 121.
181. Record on Appeal at 360, Slavin (No. COA 02-671) ("[U]ltimately the Corps
recognized that they could place sand on the seaward side of the mean high water mark.
And therefore, easements were not necessary because it was already on public trust
land.").
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to adopt a "Beach Access Plan."'82 This plan was accepted by the
Corps in August 2001.183 By this time, the Sea Turtle Project was
completed and the Wilmington Harbor Project was nearing
completion.1 84
The Beach Access Plan provided for fencing on and along the
length of the Sea Turtle Project's nourished beach and for limiting
access to the new dry sand beach to designated beach access points. 8 '
As a result, the affected property owners no longer could go directly
from their oceanfront homes to the dry sand beach. 86 This restriction
upset a number of property owners, who filed suit alleging the loss of
their right of direct access was a taking for which they were entitled to
compensation.'
In February 2002, the trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of the town and the plaintiffs appealed.188 On August 19, 2003,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina handed down its decision in
Slavin.8 9 On the question of whether the Beach Access Plan
constituted a taking, the court of appeals held that "the littoral right
of access to adjacent water is a qualified one,"'" subject to reasonable
regulation for the protection of the public rights in navigable
waters. 9' Since the plaintiffs had not claimed that the Beach Access
Plan was an unreasonable regulation of their rights of access, but
instead had alleged that the town could not limit, without
compensation, their rights of access at all, the trial court's order
182. Id. ("What the Corps required was a plan from the Town to maintain the-the
dunes that were-that were erected .... And the plan had to call for access.").
183. Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 3, Slavin (No. COA 02-671) ("The [U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers] reviewed the Town of Oak Island's access plan, and by letter dated 9
August 2001, found it to be acceptable as part of its work in kind responsibilities under the
Project Cooperation Agreement.").
184. Allegood, supra note 121.
185. In Slavin, the plaintiffs-appellants noted:
Defendant's Access Plan provides for construction of a sand dune fence on the
Renourished Beach .... The Fence is located entirely within the confines of the
Renourished Beach. As such, the Fence is located immediately between
Appellant's respective properties and the new [mean high water mark] of the
Ocean.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 6-7, Slavin (No. COA 02-671)
186. Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57,58,584 S.E.2d 100,101 (2003).
187. See Owners Lose Suit Over Path to Beach, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.),
Aug. 20, 2003, at lB.
188. Id.
189. Slavin, 160 N.C. App. at 59, 584 S.E.2d at 101.
190. Id. at 57, 584 S.E.2d at 100.
191. Id. at 61, 584 S.E.2d at 102.
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granting summary judgment was affirmed.192  A petition for
discretionary review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina was
subsequently denied. 193
The Slavin court conceded that littoral rights are vested, but the
court asserted the rights are not absolute, but qualified, subordinate
to "public trust interests,"194 a general proposition that was also
consistent with traditional common law principles.195 It is upon that
proposition that the elimination of all direct contact with, and
incidentally all direct access to, ocean waters in Slavin was predicated.
But, the question is what qualifications apply to the right of access?
That is the real crux of Slavin.
In answering that question it is important to recognize that the
traditional right of access has three components.196 One component is
the right to maintain direct contact with the waterbody itself. This is
reflected in the traditional common law view that the littoral owner
has the right of unobstructed access to the waterbody across the full
frontage of his land and the right to accretions. 197 The second is the
192. Id.
193. 357 N.C. 659, 590 S.E.2d 271 (2003).
194. Slavin, 160 N.C. App. at 61, 584 S.E.2d 102. The court never identifies the public
interests at stake in Slavin. Id. passim.
Interestingly, the statement that riparian and littoral rights are vested rights only
appears in three other North Carolina opinions and in none of the opinions does the court
hold that there was a taking of any riparian right. Roanoke Rapids Power Co. v. Roanoke
Navigation & Water Power Co., 159 N.C. 393, 75 S.E. 29 (1912); Pine Knoll Ass'n v.
Cardon, 126 N.C. App. 155, 484 S.E.2d 446 (1997); In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App.
16, 337 S.E.2d 99 (1985). Each of these cases is however distinguishable from Slavin. In
Weeks v. North Carolina Department of Natural Resources & Community Development,
the term "vested" is never used, but may be inferred from the context of the opinion. 97
N.C. App. 215,225-26, 388 S.E.2d 228,234 (1990).
195. GOULD, supra note 1, § 149, at 305 (stating riparian rights must be enjoyed in due
subjection to public rights); id. § 168, at 334 (stating the right to pier or wharf out is subject
to reasonable limitations and the common rights of the people in the waters).
196. Weeks, 97 N.C. App. at 225-26, 388 S.E.2d at 234 (stating that a littoral owner has
two distinct properties: (1) the principal estate extending to the shoreline and (2) the
appurtenant estate of submerged land benefiting the principal estate). The appurtenant
estate includes (1) the access to the navigable water and (2) the right to erect piers and
wharves. Bond v. Wool, 107 N.C. 139, 150-51, 12 S.E. 281,285 (1890).
197. See, for example, Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 136 N.E. 224 (N.Y. 1922), where
the New York Court of Appeals stated:
The town may not fill in, occupy, and obstruct with buildings the foreshore under
the pretext of providing for the public enjoyment, so as to interfere with the rights
of owners of the upland, although they may still be able to reach the water. Their
rights pass along the whole frontage of their property.
Id. at 226; see also 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 69, at 320 ("One of the most valuable of
the rights of the riparian owner is the right to preserve his contact with the water by
appropriating accretions which form along his shore."); GOULD, supra note 1, § 155, at
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right of access to the navigable portion of the water body, or deep
water.98 A third related right is the right, subject to reasonable
restrictions, to pier out to reach deep or navigable water. 199 The cases
the Slavin court relied upon were all cases falling into the third
category.2°° And these cases are distinguishable on two grounds. The
first is that the particular aspect of the right of access involved in
those cases-the right to pier or wharf out-has always been subject
to reasonable regulation;201 the second is that in none of the cited
310-11 ("[L]and formed by alluvion, or the gradual and imperceptible accretion from the
water ... belong to the owner of the contiguous land to which the addition is made.")
(emphasis in original); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(1), at 6-4
("The first, and most basic, right of a riparian owner is to access to [sic] the water.").
198. See Mason, 78 N.C. App. at 27, 337 S.E.2d at 105 (right of access to "deep" or
"navigable water"); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS., supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(1), at 6-6.
199. See, e.g., Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 588, 160 S.E. 881, 885 (1968) (ruling
that littoral proprietor has an appurtenant estate in the submerged land and the right to
construct wharves, piers, or lands, subject to such general rules and regulations as the
legislature may enact to protect the public rights in navigable waters). See generally 1
FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 62, at 279 ("The riparian owner is ... entitled to have his
contact with the water remain intact. This is what is known as the right of access, and
includes the right to erect wharves to reach the navigable portion of the stream. The
wharfage right is subject to several limitations, however ... ").
200. In its decision, the Slavin court relied upon the following cases: Bond v. Wool, 107
N.C. 139, 12 S.E. 281 (1890); Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 160 S.E. 881 (1968); and
Weeks v. North Carolina Department of Natural Resources & Community Development, 97
N.C. App. 215, 388 S.E.2d 228 (1990). Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. 57, 60, 584
S.E.2d 100, 102 (2003). In Bond, the defendant was accused interfering with the plaintiff's
right of access to his wharf. 107 N.C. at 153, 12 S.E. at 286. The plaintiff alleged that the
placement of the defendant's wharf within the defendant's area of access would cut off one
means of approach to plaintiff's wharf. Id. The court affirmed the dismissal of the action
because there was no showing that the defendant's wharf extended outside defendant's
area of access or intruded into plaintiff's. Id. Capune dealt with whether or not the
defendant had the common law right to prohibit the plaintiff from passing under the pier
on his surfboard. 273 N.C. at 587, 160 S.E.2d at 885. In a broader view, the issue was
"whether the right of a littoral proprietor to construct a pier and thereby provide access to
ocean waters of a greater depth authorizes him to exclude the public from the use of the
waters of the ocean under and along such pier," and the court said there was no such right.
Id. at 589, 160 S.E.2d at 886. In Weeks, the plaintiff wanted to build a 900-foot pier into
the sound, but was denied a permit. 97 N.C. App. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 229. He thought
he had a right to build the pier to such lengths. Id. But the court held that the exercise of
the right to pier out was not absolute but subject to reasonable limitations. Id. at 226, 388
S.E.2d at 235.
201. See Capune, 273 N.C. at 588, 160 S.E.2d at 886; Bond, 107 N.C. at 148, 12 S.E. at
284; Weeks, 97 N.C. App. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 234; GOULD, supra note 1, § 168, at 334.
When discussing the development of the right to access deep water by erecting wharves,
Gould points out that in the United States "this rule is subject to reasonable limitations."
GOULD, supra note 1, § 168, at 334.
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cases was the property owner deprived of all access to the
waterbody.2 °2
North Carolina has long recognized that soundfront property
owners have the right of access to deep water over that portion of the
waterbody forming what is referred to as the area of riparian access.20 3
It is in that area that a pier may be constructed or a channel dredged
to provide access to the deep water.2' This right of access to deep
water across public trust waters and submerged lands is not absolute.
To protect the public trust uses of such waters and submerged lands,
the State may regulate the construction of piers or dredging of
channels.205  The placement and construction of piers may be
restricted to protect shellfish beds, salt marsh, and fishery habitat.2 6
202. In Bond, the plaintiff was not at risk of losing all access to his property, something
the court pointed out when it said he would still have access to his land from the south. 107
N.C. at 151-52, 12 S.E. at 285-86. In Capune, the pier owner was not at risk of losing his
access to the water, he just had to allow the public to use the land and water under his
pier. 273 N.C. at 589, 160 S.E.2d at 886. In Weeks, the plaintiff still had access and the
right to pier out, he just could not pier out 900 feet. 97 N.C. App. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at
229.
203. See, e.g., Mason, 78 N.C. App. at 28, 337 S.E.2d at 106 (stating that riparian access
zone "only extends as far as necessary to provide access to the 'navigable parts' of the
waterway"). See generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a), at 6-6
("The right of access includes the right to proceed without unreasonable impediment to
the navigable portion of the water.").
204. See William B. Aycock, Introduction to Water Use Law in North Carolina, 46 N.C.
L. REV. 1, 18-19, (1967), discussing that sounds are navigable waterways and continuing:
Although a riparian owner does not own the bed of a navigable water course, he
does own the banks, and he is entitled to certain rights by virtue of this fact ....
Subject to regulations as may be imposed by the legislature, he has a right to
construct wharves, piers, and landings on the water frontage.
Id.; see also 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 113b, at 534 ("One is that the riparian owner's
right of access includes the right to connect his water front with the point of
navigability.").
205. Professor Farnham stated:
This right [erection of wharves] can be utilized only by those who can obtain
access to the water, and, since the only ones who can obtain such access are
riparian owners, they have a right, as members of the general public, to utilize the
soil for the erection of such wharves and piers for the purpose of aiding navigation
as can be placed there without injury to the rights of the public .... [Tihe right of
access and communication with the navigable waters, which pertains particularly
to the ownership of the upland, necessarily includes the right to fill in and to build
wharves and other structures in the shallow water in front of such land and below
low-water mark, and the exercise of such right, though subject to state regulation,
can only be interfered with for public purposes ....
1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 113b, at 533-34.
206. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.1204(d) (Aug. 1998) (explaining that a
permit to build a pier will not be given if the proposed activity might "unnecessarily
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For example, in Weeks v. North Carolina Department of Natural
Resources & Community Development,27 the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina upheld the denial of a waterfront property owner's
application for a CAMA permit to build a 900-foot-long pier in
Bogue Sound based on public trust concerns.208 This is quite different
from barring a waterfront property owner from exercising her
traditional right of maintaining direct contact with the waterbody and
having access directly from her adjacent uplands. Furthermore, in
Weeks, the court pointed out that the petitioner could still seek
permission for a shorter pier.20 9 The issue was not a complete denial
of the right of access to deep water, but only a balancing of that right
against the public trust interests existing in the state-owned lands and
waters over which that right was sought to be exercised.
In re Protest of Mason,210 another court of appeals decision,
reinforces these points. In Mason, a soundfront property owner
objected to granting by the State of a shellfish lease 21 -a public trust
use.212  The lease granted the lessee permission to use an area of
submerged land that extended into the soundfront property owner's
area of riparian access.2 13 Pursuant to this lease, the lessee planned to
place netting on the sound bottom, held in place by stakes, to protect
the shellfish beds the lessee would establish in the area. 14 The
soundfront owner asserted that these activities would infringe on his
vested riparian right of access to deep water.215 This assertion was
apparently based on the belief that only he, as the waterfront owner,
had the right to place obstructions or structures within his area of
endanger" or "significantly affect" conservation values, among other things, which are
identified in sections 113A-102 and 113A-113(b)(4) of the General Statutes of North
Carolina), available at http://www.nccoastalmanagement.netRules/Text/t15a_07h.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Among the goals laid out in those statutes is
the establishment of policy guidelines for the "[p]rotection, preservation, and conservation
of natural resources including but not limited to water use, scenic vistas, and fish and
wildlife." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-102(b)(4)(a) (2003).
207. 97 N.C. App. 215,388 S.E.2d 228 (1990).
208. Id. at 218, 388 S.E.2d at 230.
209. Id. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 235.
210. 78 N.C. App. 16, 337 S.E.2d 99 (1985).
211. Id. at 17, 337 S.E.2d at 100.
212. Fishing, including shellfishing, is one of the triad of traditional public trust uses.
Although a shellfish lease authorizes a private party to establish a shellfish bed on state-
owned submerged lands in an area where no natural shellfish beds exist, the purpose of
the lease is the promotion of a traditional public trust use of public trust lands and waters.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-202 (2003); DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTrING THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 252-53 (1990).
213. Mason, 78 N.C. App. at 18, 337 S.E.2d at 100.
214. Id. at 18-19, 337 S.E.2d at 100.
215. See id. at 27, 337 S.E.2d at 105.
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riparian access. And, in fact, an old Supreme Court of North
Carolina opinion upholding an action of trespass brought by a
waterfront owner against an adjacent waterfront owner whose pier
extended into the plaintiff's area of riparian access would appear to
substantiate such a belief.216 However, that case, unlike Mason, did
not address the right of the State as owner of the submerged public
trust lands to authorize uses by third parties of the area of riparian
access. The waterfront owner's right to use the area of riparian access
is in the nature of an easement appurtenant. And, as is the case with
such an easement, the owner of the dominant estate-in Mason, the
State-is entitled to make use of the area subject to the easement so
long as such use does not interfere with the rights of the easement
holder.2 17 The Mason lease contained an express condition that "that
portion of the lease area within the limits of ... [Mason's] areas of
riparian rights shall be made subject to the lawful exercise of those
rights including the right to build a pier for access to navigable waters
within the lease. '218 Thus in Mason, as in Weeks, there was not a
complete denial of any right of direct access. In fact, Mason stands
for just the opposite proposition: that, when authorizing third party
uses of a riparian owner's area of riparian access, the State must
respect the rights of the riparian owner.219
In the Slavin setting, analogous reasonable restrictions might
limit the type and nature of the littoral means of direct access to the
shore and ocean, but not foreclose all direct access. Such reasonable
restrictions are in place all along the North Carolina coast. 2 0  For
216. See O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937) (issuing a mandatory
injunction to compel removal of wharf constructed by neighboring owner because it
trespassed upon plaintiff's area of riparian access). But see Flowers v. Blackbeard Sailing
Club, Ltd., 115 N.C. App. 349, 350, 444 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1994) (barring an objecting
riparian owner from seeking injunction due to failure to pursue administrative remedies
before North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission).
217. See generally JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND LICENSES IN LAND 8.04[1] (rev. ed. 2001) (discussing rights of owner of servient
estate).
218. Mason, 78 N.C. App. at 26, 337 S.E.2d at 105.
219. The littoral right of access to the waterbody is not the same as the right of access
an ordinary landowner has to a public road. See Dep't of Transp. v. Suit City of Aventura,
774 So. 2d. 9, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The State may be entitled to cut off a
landowner's direct access to a road or highway without paying compensation. Id. at 12.
But a complete elimination of a littoral owner's direct access, without compensation, is
inconsistent with the notion that littoral rights are unique and vested rights. Id.
220. CAMA regulations reasonably restrict beach access along the North Carolina
coast. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0308(c) (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.nccoastal management.net/Rules/Text/tl5a-07h.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); id. r. 7K.0207 (Dec. 1991).
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example, the construction of access walkways extending across the
dunes from homes to the beach have to be designed and constructed
in a manner which entails negligible alteration on the primary dune,
limited to pedestrian use, less than six feet in width, and raised above
the dune.22 But, such restrictions do not preclude all direct access by
the oceanfront property owner.
If complete abridgment of an oceanfront owner's right of direct
contact with the ocean is to be justified, it must be on the ground that
the State,z2 as owner of the submerged lands fronting the oceanfront
property, has a common law right to fill those submerged lands and
destroy oceanfront owner's littoral right of maintaining direct contact
with the ocean without paying any compensation. Whether the state
has such a right is not clearly answered by North Carolina case law.
a. Does Mere Ownership of Submerged Land Grant Both a
Right To Fill and To Terminate Existing Littoral Rights?
The mere fact that the State owns the submerged land and has a
right to fill it does not mean that it may terminate common law
littoral rights by filling the submerged lands. No North Carolina case
directly addresses the question. 223  The issue, however, has been
221. Id. r. 7H.0308(c) (Aug. 2002).
222. In Slavin, it was the Town of Oak Island, not the State of North Carolina, which
undertook the beach nourishment project. Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App.
57, 58, 584 S.E.2d 100, 101 (2003). Serious questions have been raised as to whether the
town (1) in fact had the requisite authority to fill the state-owned submerged lands and (2)
exceeded its statutory municipal powers in limiting the oceanfront property owners' direct
access to the ocean. For an excellent discussion of the latter issue, see Brian C. Fork,
Recent Development, A First Step in the Wrong Direction: Slavin v. Town of Oak Island
and the Taking of Littoral Rights of Direct Beach Access, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1510, 1513-18
(2004).
223. There are two early twentieth-century decisions, Atlantic & N.C.R. Co. v. Way,
169 N.C. 1, 85 S.E. 12 (1915) and Atlantic & N.C.R. Co. v. Way, 172 N.C. 774, 90 S.E. 937
(1916) (involving the same litigation over the title to submerged land raised above sea
level), that might form the basis of an argument that the State's title to, and control over,
submerged lands allows it to fill submerged lands and thereby terminate any common law
riparian or littoral rights which may have existed. However, on close examination, the
decisions do not support such an argument. These cases involved land in Morehead City,
North Carolina. Atlantic, 169 N.C. at 2, 85 S.E. at 13. In this litigation, the plaintiff
asserted title to an area of formerly submerged land covered by a grant allowing it to
construct wharves on submerged lands fronting its uplands property adjacent to Bogue
Sound. Id. As the result of a state project involving the construction of a seawall and the
filling of the submerged land behind it-an act to which the plaintiff consented-the area
covered by plaintiff's grant was raised above sea level. Id. at 3, 85 S.E. at 13. The plaintiff
did not claim that the filling had taken any of its littoral rights; only that under its grant it
had title to the raised land. Id. at 2-3, 85 S.E. at 13. Since plaintiff's grant was limited to
an easement for wharf purposes and the plaintiff consented to the filling of the area
encompassed by the grant, an act incompatible with the easement, the court held that the
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addressed in other jurisdictions.224 For example, in Tiffany v. Town of
225 deidOyster Bay, a case decided by the Court of Appeals of New York,
the waterfront property owner, believing he owned the submerged
land adjacent to his uplands, filled a sizable portion.226 Unfortunately
for him, it was determined that it was the town that held title to the
submerged land, both before and after it was raised.227 Having title to
the raised land, the town decided to make full use of it and construct
a structure containing thirty-three public bath houses of about fifty
feet by ten to fifteen feet each.2 8  The waterfront property owner
sued the town and the court enjoined the town from proceeding with
its plan because it would interfere with the waterfront owner's right
of access along the full length of his frontage.2 29 According to the
court:
[Tihe filled-in land retains its character as land under water,
and the plaintiff, as owner of the adjacent upland, has the same
rights, and no greater rights, in and across the same, as if no
filling had been done, or as if the filling had been done lawfully
by the town; and that plaintiffs rights as a riparian owner
wharf easement rights were extinguished. Atlantic, 172 N.C. at 778-79, 90 S.E. at 939-40.
Therefore, the key to the loss of plaintiff's easement and any other rights of use to the
submerged lands and overlying waters was the plaintiff's consent. There is no suggestion
that, without the consent of the easement holder, the State may fill state-owned
submerged land and destroy either (1) private easement rights acquired by a state grant or
(2) common law riparian or littoral rights.
224. In addition to Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, which is discussed infra notes 225-32
and accompanying text, cases from other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion.
In Hilt v. Weber, the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
The state cannot impair or defeat riparian rights by a grant of land under water;
nor cut off the owner's access to the water by construction of a highway; nor grant
to strangers the right to erect wharves in front of his property; nor erect a
bathhouse on the shore to interfere with the right of access. On the contrary, the
right of the state to use the bed of the lake, except for the trust purposes, is
subordinate to that of the riparian owner.
233 N.W. 159, 168 (Mich. 1930) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also
People v. Travis, 119 N.E. 437, 442 (N.Y. 1918) ("[W]hoever owned the fee of the land
under water it was subject to his right of access to the water. It seems to follow that the
town could not fill in and reclaim such land and so deprive him of it."). See generally
GOULD, supra note 1, § 150, at 279 (explaining that a state's mere ownership of the bed
and shores of navigable waters does not mean the State can take a riparian or littoral
property owner's right of access away without compensation).
225. 136 N.E. 224 (N.Y. 1922).
226. Id. at 225.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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continue and he has not become an inland owner to the extent of
the fill.230
The court held that the town of Oyster Bay was not precluded from
using the filled land as a public beach,231 but only prohibited from
erecting structures which would interfere with the waterfront
property owner's direct access, along the whole of his frontage, to the
water by crossing the filled land.232 It is interesting that in the Tiffany
case the filled land retained its character as submerged land insofar as
the plaintiff's littoral rights were concerned. But, of course, that is
simply an elliptical way of saying that, under the Tiffany
circumstances, littoral rights may not be terminated by filling without
compensation.
b. May the State Terminate Existing Littoral Rights When the
Purpose of the Filling is To Protect or Promote Legitimate Public
Trust Rights or Interests?
Although mere ownership of submerged lands does not mean
that the State's filling and raising of submerged lands permits an
uncompensated interference or termination of existing littoral rights,
if the purpose of the filling is the protection or promotion of
legitimate public trust uses or interests, then any interference or
termination would not constitute a compensable taking.3 3 In a
number of cases, the courts have held that where the State exercises
its powers pursuant to the public trust and deprives an owner of his
right of access there is no compensable taking.234 For example, in
230. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
231. Id. The town was asserting its right to use the filled land in any way it considered
proper, free from all easements the plaintiff may claim. Id. Here, the town wanted to
devote the filled land to the public as a park. Id. The court ruled that the town would not
be able to construct buildings on the filled land that would interfere with the plaintiffs
rights "under the pretext of providing for public enjoyment." Id. The court, however, did
not say that the land could not be used as a public beach. The only requirement was that
there be no construction that would impede the plaintiff's riparian rights.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text. See generally Lake Front-East
Fifty-Fifth Street Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Op. 1 (1939), affd, 36 N.E.2d 196
(Ohio Ct. App. 1941) (stating that a littoral or riparian owner's right of access is not an
unlimited right; rather, the State does not have to compensate the owner for interference
with or the destruction of his right of access when the work in front of his property is done
for the improvement of navigation and water commerce); 1 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(1), at 6-7 (noting that the government may cut off right of access
through navigation servitudes or similar public rights).
234. A 1939 Ohio Court of Common Pleas opinion, Lake Front-East Fifty-Fifth Street
Corp. v. City of Cleveland, cites a long line of cases from a number of jurisdictions which
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235Koyer v. Miner, a 1916 California case, to improve navigation in the
City of San Pedro harbor, a seawall was erected on state-owned
submerged land within the harbor and the area between the seawall
and the shoreline filled.236  The filled area was then leased to a
company for use in connection with an electric railroad franchise. 37
As a result, the plaintiff's direct access to the water was cut off,
leaving him with access only by means of the neighboring public
streets. 238 Quoting from an earlier case also involving a claim of loss
of access, the court stated:
When the public authorities see fit to make improvements on
the land below high-water mark for purposes of navigation, the
riparian owner must yield thereto .... The littoral rights of the
[plaintiff] can not impinge upon the control by the state of
tidelands for the public purposes of navigation and fishery, or
affect the public easement for those purposes .... If such
improvements have the effect of cutting off access over said
tidelands from the upland lot of the plaintiff, it is no ground of
complaint, because, as has been pointed out, it had no right as
an upland owner to the free and unobstructed access to
navigable waters over said tidelands as against the right of the
state to at any time devote them to the improvement of the
harbor of Oakland in aid of the public easement of navigation
and commerce.239
This case and similar cases from other jurisdictions240 firmly support
the proposition that littoral rights of access may be cut off, without
compensation, when the State fills adjacent submerged land in the
process of promoting or protecting public trust uses or interests. 241
Therefore, in some instances, the public trust doctrine would support
the termination, without compensation, of an oceanfront property
owner's right of direct access to the ocean, as well as other littoral
rights.
allowed an interference or destruction of the riparian or littoral right of access without
compensation when done in aid of navigation and commerce. 21 Ohio Op. at 20.
235. 156 P. 1023 (Cal. 1916).
236. Id. at 1024.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1024.
239. Id. at 1025 (quoting Henry Dalton & Sons Co. v. Oakland, 143 P. 721, 722-23
(Cal. 1914)).
240. See supra note 234.
241. Koyer, 156 P. at 1025.
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c. What are Legitimate Public Trust Rights or Interests?
In the context of a beach project, the important questions are
what interests or uses constitute "public trust" uses or interests and
whether the protection or promotion of such uses or interests is the
purpose of the project. In a number of jurisdictions, public trust uses
or interests are limited to the traditional common law triad:
navigation, water commerce, and fishing.242 In those jurisdictions, a
beach project having as its purpose shoreline protection and
reduction of storm damage to oceanfront homes and buildings and
public infrastructure would not satisfy a public trust test. Unlike the
Koyer case,243 the typical beach project does not involve a filling of
submerged lands as an intricate part of a harbor improvement
project. As happened in Slavin,24 the sand that is deposited on the
beach may spoil as a result of some channel maintenance or other
harbor dredging project, but the fact that a spoil site is needed and
the beach nourishment project provides an acceptable location does
not provide an intrinsic link between the navigation project and the
beach nourishment project. There may be many other acceptable
locations for deposit of the soil.245 In order for a sufficient linkage to
exist between a navigation or harbor project and the depositing of soil
in a particular location, the deposit site should be located within the
harbor area and form part of the upland harbor improvements.
Absent a requirement of such a linkage, the dredged spoil could be
deposited in any coastal location on any state-owned submerged
lands and the argument made that the filling promotes public trust
interests. If that were the case, the continued existence of the littoral
right of access would depend on the whim of the authority deciding
where to deposit dredged spoil. Surely, a more sufficient connection
between the navigation channel or harbor dredging and the deposit
site should be required before an oceanfront property owner's littoral
right of direct access to the ocean is terminated without
compensation.246
242. See, e.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 18, § 31.01, at 81 (stating the
three traditional public trust interests: navigation, fishing, and water commerce) (citing
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)); JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., 2
WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW: POSSESSORY ESTATES AND PRESENT INTERESTS IN
REAL PROPERTY § 16-11 (5th ed. 1999) ("Using waters for navigational purposes and
fishing purposes constitute traditional public rights.").
243. See supra note 235.
244. See supra note 161.
245. State legislation, coastal management regulations and permit requirements will
dictate which locations are acceptable.
246. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
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In a number of jurisdictions, a broader group of activities are
considered to be part of the public trust.247 North Carolina's accepted
public trust interests or uses include "the right to navigate, swim,
hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in the watercourses of
the state and the right to freely use and enjoy the state's ocean and
estuarine beaches .... "248 Since one public trust right is the right to
use and enjoy the state's beaches,249 actions taken by the State to
protect the beaches from severe erosion and loss of public use
arguably would permit, without compensation, restricting or denying
oceanfront property owners direct access to ocean waters across the
raised shore. The difficulty for the state in most instances is that
beach projects are federally-funded projects, the typical purpose of
which is storm hazard mitigation"0 and in no jurisdiction is storm
hazard mitigation itself a public trust interest. The protection,
creation, or restoration of a dry sand beach is only an incidental
consequence of a federally funded beach project. 2 1 The primary
247. See generally SLADE ET AL., supra note 212, at 129-53.
248. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2003).
249. Of course, one interpretative question is what are the "state's beaches"? Does
that include only the wet sand or does it include the dry sand beach as well? That issue is
currently being litigated in North Carolina. See supra note 12. The following discussion
assumes that the State's position in that litigation will prevail. If it does not, then beach
projects in general would not satisfy a public trust test.
250. In the typical large-scale federal-state beach nourishment project, the principal
purpose is to build up the beach and dunes to protect shoreline homes and other
structures from erosion and storm and hurricane damage. Recreational benefits are
incidental to the this purpose. The current Corps regulations state:
14.1. Beach Erosion Control.
(e). Project Formulation. Shore projection projects are formulated to
provide for hurricane and storm damage reduction. On this basis any
enhancement of recreation that may also result is considered incidental
14.2. Recreation.... If ... the project is characterized as being primarily for
recreation..., it will not be proposed by the Corps as a Federal undertaking,
since recreation developments are not accorded priority in Civil Works
budget decisions ....
ENGINEER PAMPHLET, supra note 107, 14-1(e), 14-2.
251. This is not to suggest that the federal purpose underlying a beach nourishment
project describes the totality of the public benefits from the project or incidental purposes
of the project. Purposes such as protection of infrastructure and public safety provide
valid public benefits and may be important incidental purposes for a project. But if these
other purposes are to provide a justification for the non-consensual, uncompensated
termination of existing littoral rights, then these purposes must both be valid public trust
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purpose-storm hazard mitigation-would not fall within even North
Carolina's broad list of public trust uses.252
That does not mean that a particular beach project, or a portion
of the project, legitimately could not be sufficiently linked with the
public trust. It is arguable that, in Slavin, the portion of the project
that was designed to protect sea turtles and their habitat might in fact
be sufficiently connected to fishing to qualify. Sea turtles are not only
creatures of the sea but, until recently, were captured and eaten just
as other sea creatures.253 When the populations of species of sea
turtles declined and appeared endangered, the taking of sea turtles
was prohibited and the government passed legislation to protect and
enhance sea turtle habitat.254  The re-establishing of the sea turtle
habitat and the closure of direct access to the beach to protect the
habitat then is an activity related to traditional public trust uses. And,
if sufficiently related, the State could fill the submerged lands for that
purpose, cut off the littoral owners from direct access and contact
with the ocean, and not have to pay any compensation to those
owners.
How much of a public trust connection is necessary to allow the
State to cut off the littoral owner's right of access across filled state
submerged lands? To avoid the Fifth Amendment compensation,255
one requirement of modern takings law is that the government
regulation must "substantially advance legitimate state interests.2 56
Absent such a nexus, the governmental regulation is only a ruse to
avoid constitutionally compelled compensation. 7 In the coastal
setting, to avoid any compensation requirement, planners could
always include in the beach project description the promotion or
protection of some public trust interest in the beach as an incidental
purposes and substantial purposes of the project. Otherwise, there would be no realistic
limitation on the state power to terminate littoral rights since some incidental public
benefit or public trust purpose could almost always be found for a beach project.
252. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
253. See Leatherback Sea Turtles, at http://www.bagheera.com/inthewild/van_anim_
turtle.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2005) ("Humans have long hunted adult sea turtles for
food and for their shells and other parts.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
254. See NOAA Fisheries Office of Protected Resources, About Marine Turtles, at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot-res[PR3/Turtles/turtles.html ("All six species of sea turtles
in the US are protected under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.") (last visited Aug. 20,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
255. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
256. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
257. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escodido, 503 U.S. 519, 530 (1992) (stating that sufficient
nexus must exist); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) (quoting
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-62).
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purpose. Therefore, unless the purpose of a beach project is
substantially connected with one or more legitimate public trust
purposes-absent the signing of an agreement under which the
oceanfront property owner gives up some or all of her traditional
common law right of access or the provision of statutory substitute
littoral rights-the fact that the filling is a filling of state-owned public
trust lands does not allow the state or other public entity to terminate,
without compensation, an oceanfront property owner's right to have
direct access to the water. Title to the raised submerged land may be
in the state, but, irrespective of whether the land is submerged or
raised, that title remains subject to the littoral owner's right of access.
Furthermore, even assuming a beach project qualified under the
North Carolina public trust test, in situations in which there is a
complete denial of all direct access, the State also should have the
burden of establishing that such a restriction is necessary and that no
lesser limitation on the right of direct access reasonably would
achieve the objective of protecting the public trust interest at stake.258
4. The Littoral Right of View
a. Is There Such a Right in North Carolina?
In addition to impairment of the oceanfront owner's right of
access, a beach nourishment project may seriously affect the
oceanfront owner's view of the ocean. Prior to the project, the
oceanfront owner may have had a clear, unobstructed view of the sea.
Following the project, the oceanfront owner may be looking at the
backside of an artificial dune or be eye level with a public boardwalk
constructed along the nourished beach. 259  Gone is a valuable
attribute of the oceanfront property-the ability to sit on the deck or
in the living room and gaze out to sea. In such circumstances does the
258. See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 11.10 (2d ed. 1996)
(discussing the requirement of proportionality between means and ends in takings law).
259. Impairment of the right of view may not be an issue outside areas in which the
oceanfront homes are older. Compliance with federal and state flood zone regulations
means that the first habitable floor of new construction must be elevated, generally on
pilings, to or above the base (or 100) year flood elevation. See Floodplain Management
Criteria for Flood-Prone Areas, 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(e) (2004) (making code requirements for
all new construction and substantial improvements in the coastal high hazard area); N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0308(d) (Aug. 2002) (listing construction standards),
available at http://www.nccoastalmanagement.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_07h.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Unless the manmade dunes are extraordinarily high or
other facilities that obstruct the view are placed on the state-owned beach, beach
nourishment projects and other activities are unlikely to obstruct the view of adjacent
oceanfront property owners.
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oceanfront owner have any legal claim for the impairment of her or
his ocean view? That depends on whether the right of view is one of
the common law rights of littoral landowners.
No North Carolina case explicitly recognizes the right of view,2 °
and it is not one of the traditionally listed rights of littoral or riparian
ownership. 261 Traditional littoral and riparian rights are grounded in
the needs of navigation, fishing, and water commerce, not in
recreational needs and activities.262  But times have changed, and
most people buy waterfront land, whether for commercial or personal
use, for its recreational benefits, water views and breezes, and not for
any water commerce feature.263 And, most waterfront owners would
be surprised to discover that the State could obstruct that view,
destroying much of the value of the property, without having to
260. In Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., Judge Butzner states that "[iln North
Carolina, a riparian landowner has a right to the agricultural, recreational, and scenic use
and enjoyment of the stream bordering his land" but cites no authority for the proposition.
510 F.2d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1975).
261. Although the right of an unobstructed view is not one of the traditional littoral
rights, in 1918, the first Florida opinion discussing the right does it in a manner suggesting
that there is no doubt as to the right. In Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Railway Co., the court,
without citations, simply says "[tihe common-law riparian proprietor enjoys [the right] ...
of an unobstructed view over the waters .... 78 So. 491, 501 (Fla. 1917). On the other
hand, a 1901 Illinois case, Chicago Yacht Club v. Marks, rejects the proposition that a
riparian has a protected right of view and states that no authority has been cited to the
court supporting such a proposition. 97 Ill. App. 406, 413 (1901), affd, 76 N.E. 582 (111.
1905).
262. See, e.g., 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 62, at 278-80 (discussing rights of riparian
owners and activities associated with rights).
263. In the 1930s the city of Los Angeles used the power of eminent domain to acquire
the water in the streams flowing into Mono Lake. The water was to be diverted to supply
the needs of the city. One consequence of the diversion would be a drastic lowering of the
lake to one-tenth of its existing level within five years. The plaintiffs in City of Los
Angeles v. Aitken, were shoreline resort owners, whose properties would dramatically
decrease in value as a result of the lowering of the lake level. 52 P.2d 585, 587 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1935). In holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to substantial sums as damages for
their littoral rights to require the maintenance of the natural level of the lake, the court
said:
They purchased land bordering on this unique lake and constructed improvements
thereon for the maintenance of auto camps and pleasure resorts which are
dependent for their success upon the income derived from the traveling public
which is attracted to this alluring lake by these advantages. These enterprises
depend on the continuation of these attractions. Without the existence of this lake
and its surrounding attractions the value of the respondents' properties will be
practically destroyed. These privileges and attractions constitute important assets
in determining the value of their properties. Moreover, among the essential
littoral rights which are possessed by the respondents is their lawful right to the
unmolested access to the lake.
Id. at 588-89.
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compensate the waterfront property owner. Unfortunately, presently
only a very few jurisdictions provide legal protection to the
waterfront owner's view of the waterbody.26
b. Judicial Recognition of the Right of View
Although the origins of judicial recognition of the concept of the
right of view is found in a line of Florida cases, 265 a recent New Jersey
case is the first to apply the concept in the beach nourishment setting.
In 1993, as part of a beach nourishment project, the Corps and State
of New Jersey built new sand dunes along seven miles of New Jersey
shoreline.26 The new, nine foot high dunes completely obstructed the
previously existing view of the ocean from the first floor of a
condominium.267 In a case of first impression, the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that loss of ocean view was an
element of compensable severance damages.2' The basis for the
court's conclusion was that an ocean view was a feature that played a
substantial role in determining what a buyer of property would pay
and that an owner of such property had a reasonable expectation
would continue.269
The conclusion of the New Jersey court, and other courts that
have considered the issue, makes sense. As realtors say, the most
important feature of a piece of property is "location, location,
location." Not taking into account when appraising an oceanfront
property the fact that it has an ocean view, which was the position of
the defendants in the New Jersey case, is silly. The New Jersey court
did say that the right of view was not absolute, which means that
the State could, in some instances, cut off that right without having to
pay compensation for the loss. But, interference, without
264. The following jurisdictions recognize a right to an unobstructed view: (1) Florida,
see Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 801 (Fla. 1957); Thiesen, 78 So. at 501; Lee County v.
Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); (2) Mississippi, see Miss. State
Highway Comm'n, v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367, 377 (Miss. 1992) (holding diminution from
loss of view compensable); Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 633 (Miss.
1967); and (3) New Jersey, see Ocean City v. Maffucci, 740 A.2d 630, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999).
265. See Hayes, 91 So. at 800 ("An upland owner must in all cases be permitted a
direct, unobstructed view of the Channel ..... "); Thiesen, 78 So. at 501 (holding that the
common law riparian owner enjoys the right of an unobstructed view over the waterbody);
Padgett v. Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 178 So. 2d 900, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (citing Thiesen, 78 So. at 501).
266. Ocean City, 740 A.2d at 631-32.
267. Id. at 632.
268. Id. at 640.
269. Id. at 641.
270. Id. at 641 (citing Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. California, 70 Cal. 2d 282 (1969)).
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compensation, with the right of view should be permissible only in the
same types of circumstances in which the government could limit or
cut off the waterfront owners direct contact and access to the
waterbody. The creation of a better, wider public beach, the
protection of the shoreline and buildings from storm damage, or the
construction of a boardwalk to provide the public with better access
and views of the ocean would not be among the acceptable purposes.
Whether recognition of the right of view will pose significant
costs or other impairments of beach nourishment projects remains to
be seen. In most instances, oceanfront owners are the ones seeking
the sand and readily sign the necessary documents granting those
responsible for the project the easements or other rights required for
the project to go forward. However, there is anecdotal evidence that
some beachfront owners are objecting to beach nourishment projects
because the created dunes will interfere with their views and would
prefer to have water lapping at a seawall or bulkhead. Of course, if
seawall and bulkhead construction projects are banned or severely
restricted, the beachfront owners' options are limited to either a
beach nourishment project with dunes or ocean waters eroding away
their land and buildings.
V. PROTECTING COASTAL LANDS: LITrORAL OWNER'S RIGHT To
CONSTRUCT PERMANENT EROSION CONTROL STRUCTURES
Faced with the loss of valuable seashore frontage and potential
damage to, and destruction of, expensive beachfront homes or other
structures as the natural processes of wind and wave action or
periodic storms eat away at a shoreline, it is not surprising that
owners of oceanfront property want to place rip-rap 27 1 seawalls, or
other structures along the shoreline to protect their lands and
buildings.272 On the other hand, it is common scientific knowledge
that the consequence of one landowner placing a structure such as a
seawall along her portion of the shoreline results in a series of
271. "Rip-rap" are broken stones thrown together irregularly or loosely to construct a
revetment, which functions as a type of seawall. See CORNELIA DEAN, AGAINST THE
TIDE: THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S BEACHES 52 (1999).
272. A well-known example of this is the Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v.
Tomlinson litigation. 134 N.C. App. 217, 517 S.E.2d 406 (1999). After North Carolina
banned in 1995 the construction of hardened beach erosion control structures, oceanfront
property owners threatened by erosion resorted to placing large sand bags to protect their
land and buildings. See, e.g., Richard Stradling, Sandbag Extension Granted, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 23, 2003, at B1; Mark Schreiner, Bald Head Sandbag
System Gets Senate OK: Bill a Matter of Fairness, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.),
July 17, 2003, at B1.
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significant adverse consequences. 273 The first is that water action and
currents will cause even greater erosion to adjacent lands not
similarly protected by a seawall.274 The second is that erosion of the
coastline in front of the seawall will continue unabated.275 From these
events follow at least two additional consequences. Neighboring
landowners will be compelled to construct seawalls to protect their
lands and buildings, 76 and as erosion continues, it becomes necessary
to build stronger, perhaps higher seawalls.27 7 The net adverse effect
of these actions on the public interest is serious. The existence of
seawalls and the natural process of erosion inevitably lead to the loss
of the dry and wet sand beaches. 278  Thus, the question arises: do
273. THE HEINZ CENTER, EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS 58 (Apr. 2000)
(description of adverse impacts of hard erosion control structures), available at
http://www.heinzctr.org/NEW WEB/PDF/erosnrpt.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks&view=Fit
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 29, at
51-53 (identifying ten truths about shoreline armoring: (1) armoring destroys beaches, (2)
no need for stabilization unless some builds too close to the shoreline, (3) small number of
people create the need for armoring, (4) once you start, you can not stop, (5) costs more
than property saved worth, (6) armoring begets more armoring, (7) armoring grows
bigger, (8) armoring politically difficult issue because of long-term environmental impacts,
(9) politically difficult because no compromise is possible, and (10) you can have buildings
or beaches, not both).
274. As Cornelia Dean explains:
Through a process imperfectly understood, erosion is worse at the ends of
seawalls, where they often experience severe scour. In part, this phenomenon may
occur because the wall cuts the beach off from a source of sand. The underwater
profile at the wall must steepen if the amount of sediment in the water is to remain
constant. As a result, many walled towns have repeatedly had to extend their
walls when these 'end effects' began to threaten neighboring property or the
survival of the walls themselves.
DEAN, supra note 271, at 53.
275. Id. ("If the beach is eroding, a seawall will cause it to disappear. A wall by its
nature draws a line in the sand. But the ocean does not respect this line. It keeps moving
in. Eventually it meets the wall. Result: no beach.").
276. PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 29, at 52 ("Shoreline armoring begets more
shoreline armoring. All structures eventually cause sand supply deficits on adjacent
beaches, resulting in a need for armoring. Seawalls get longer, single groins become groin
fields, and offshore breakwaters are extended.").
277. Pilkey and Dixon note:
Shoreline armoring grows bigger. Shoreline engineering structures are inevitably
damaged or destroyed and are then replaced by grander ones. Often the reason a
structure is damaged is because the waves have removed the protective beach ....
As the protective beach is diminished, walls must be increased in size.
Id. at 53.
278. PILKEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 91 ("Whenever a fixed, immovable object (e.g., a
seawall or highway) is built adjacent to an eroding beach, the beach eventually jams up
against the wall. Whatever is causing the shoreline retreat is unaffected by the wall, and
erosion continues until the beach is gone.").
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oceanfront property owners have a common law right to take such
action or may the State ban the construction of permanent,
protective, beach-hardening structures to protect the dry and wet
sand beaches, as has happened in North Carolina, without engaging in
an unconstitutional taking of a common law property right?
A. Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tomlinson
Until the 1970s, North Carolina did not regulate the construction
of seawalls and other hardened erosion control structures along ocean
shorelines. 27 9  Prior to that time, when their structures were
threatened with erosion, one response of private property owners was
a seawall. 28° A complete ban on the construction of seawalls was not
imposed until 1985, when the CAMA rules were amended to provide:
Permanent erosion control structures may cause significant
adverse impacts on the value and enjoyment of adjacent
properties or public access to and use of the ocean beach, and
therefore, are prohibited. Such structures include, but are not
limited to: bulkheads; seawalls; revetments; jetties; groins and
breakwaters.281
This CAMA "hardened structure rule" was unsuccessfully challenged
on a number of grounds in the Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v.
Tomlinson litigation. 282
The Shell Island case began during the early 1990s. At that time,
the movement of the inlet adjacent to the Shell Island Condominium,
located at the north end of Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, was
rapidly moving toward the structure. 3 Soon, the continued erosion
of the inlet shoreline posed such a threat that the property owners
association sought permits to construct a seawall to protect the
structure from being undermined by the waters and currents of the
inlet.2' 4  But, the permit was denied.285  The property owners
association then sued the state alleging a denial of their common law
279. See infra note 310 and accompanying discussion.
280. See infra note 312.
281. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0308(a)(1)(B) (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.nccoastalmanagement.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_07h.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
282. 134 N.C. App. 217, 517 S.E.2d 406 (1999).
283. North Carolina Seawall Ban Stands up to Legal Challenge, COASTAL SERVICES
(Mar./Apr. 2000) ("By the mid-1990s, Mason Inlet was migrating south at a rate of a foot
per day."), available at http://www.csc.noaa.gov/magazine/2000/02/nc.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
284. Shell Island,134 N.C. App. at 219, 517 S.E.2d at 409.
285. Id. at 220, 517 S.E.2d at 409-10.
1488 [Vol. 83
OCEANFRONT PROPERTY
property right to build an erosion control structure.286 In response to
that claim, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina stated:
The invasion of property and reduction in value which plaintiffs
allege clearly stems from the natural migration of Mason's
Inlet, and plaintiffs have based their takings claim on their need
for "a permanent solution to the erosion that threatens its [sic]
property," and the premise that "[tihe protection of property
from erosion is an essential right of property owners .... " The
allegations in plaintiffs' complaint have no support in the law,
and plaintiffs have failed to cite to this Court any persuasive
authority for the proposition that a littoral or riparian
landowner has a right to erect hardened structures in statutorily
designated areas of environmental concern to protect their
property from erosion and migration. The courts of this state
have considered natural occurrences such as erosion and
migration of waters to be, in fact, natural occurrences, a
consequence of being a riparian or littoral landowner, which
consequence at times operates to divest landowners of their
property.m
Thus, the absolute prohibition embodied in the CAMA rule was
upheld.' Subsequently, in 2003, the North Carolina General
Assembly passed legislation specifically banning the construction of
erosion control structures on the ocean shorelineY789
On its facts, the result in Shell Island is correct, but the issue of
whether waterfront property owners have any common law right to
erect hardened structures in statutorily designated areas of
environmental concern is not as simple as the court makes it appear.
The evolving common law principles applicable to diversion of
surface waters, custom, and past regulatory practices strongly suggest
that property owners do have a qualified right to erect seawalls and
286. Id. at 228, 517 S.E.2d at 414.
287. Id.
288. All was not lost for the Shell Island owners. In 2002, as part of the Mason Inlet
Renovation Project, the inlet was moved 3,000 feet to the north of the Shell Island Resort,
and so far it appears to be relatively stable. See Gareth McGrath, One Year Later, Mason
Inlet's Move Earns Mixed Reviews, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Mar. 14, 2003, at
1A. Subsequent to the opening of the new inlet, the old Mason Inlet was closed on March
14, 2002. Id.
289. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-115.1(b) (2003); see also id. § 113A-115.1(a)(1)
(defining erosion control structures to include "a breakwater, groin, jetty, revetment,
seawall, or any similar structure"). " 'Ocean shoreline' means the Atlantic Ocean, the
oceanfront beaches, and frontal dunes. The term 'ocean shoreline' includes an ocean
inland and lands adjacent to an ocean inlet." Id. § 113A-115.1(a)(2).
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other hardened structures to protect their land from erosion or other
migration of waters.
B. The Common Law and Coastal Erosion Structures
Prior to the Shell Island decision, no North Carolina opinion
addressed the rights of coastal landowners to build erosion control
structures. Early North Carolina common law principles applicable
to controlling surface waters suggest that no such right exists; whereas
more recent cases would support the existence of such a right.
1. The Traditional Common Law Rules
Until the twentieth century, in the eastern United States, the law
applied to diversion of surface waters could be divided into two
competing approaches-the common enemy rule and the civil rule.290
Under the common enemy rule, surface water was viewed as the
common enemy of all landowners and a landowner could take
whatever steps necessary to protect her land from harm.291 Although
the most frequent subject of the rule was diffuse surface waters,292 the
rule also applied to ocean waters. 93 Under that accepted nineteenth-
century principle it was every oceanfront landowner for herself. Each
landowner had the right to erect structures to protect her land from
the ravages of the sea even if the consequence of that action was to
force adjacent landowners to erect similar structures or face the loss
of their lands and structures.294 The strict civil rule is the polar
290. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 10.3(b), at 10-38 to -59 (Robert E. Beck
ed., Lexis Nexis ed. 1991, repl. vol. 2000) [hereinafter 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS].
The civil rule was also know as the "natural servitude rule." Id. § 10.03(b)(2), at 10-50.
291. See id. § 10.03(b)(1), at 10-39.
292. See id. § 10.03(b), at 10-38.
293. See TARLOCK, supra note 14, at § 3.12 ("The initial common law rule was the
common enemy rule .... The common law rule was adopted in England to allow coastal
property owners to erect groins to protect their property, and states continue to adhere to
it for similar policy reasons.").
294. See Grundy v. Brack Family Trust, 67 P.3d 500, 506 (Wash. App. 2003) (applying
common enemy rule to claim that neighbor's seawall is nuisance), petition for review
granted, 79 P. 3d 445 (Wash. 2003). In Cass v. Dicks, the Washington Supreme Court
stated:
If a land owner whose lands are exposed to inroads of the sea, or to inundations
from adjacent creeks or rivers, erects sea-walls or dams, for the protection of his
land, and by so doing causes the tide, the current, or the waves to flow against the
land of his neighbor, and wash it away, or cover it with water, the landowner so
causing an injury to is neighbor is not responsible in damages to the latter, as he
has done no wrong, _..aving acted in self-defense and having a right to protect his
land and his crops from inundation.
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opposite of the common law "common enemy rule." Under that rule,
a landowner is liable for any interference with the natural flow of
surface waters which causes injury to other lands.295 Application of
that rule to coastal erosion control structures would prohibit their
construction.296
2. The Modern Reasonable Use Rule
During the twentieth century, many jurisdictions abandoned
these rules, adopting instead the concept of reasonable use as the
standard for determining whether a landowner is liable for damage to
neighboring landowners for actions interfering with natural water
flow patterns.297 Initially the reasonable use rule was applied to
actions affecting the flow of surface water,298 but more recently it has
been explicitly applied to questions involving the rights of owners of
oceanfront property.299 The reasonable use rule, in essence, applies
the modern balancing test utilized in evaluating whether an activity is
a nuisance to determine the liability, if any, of the owner of an
erosion control structure to another property owner whose lands have
been adversely impacted by the changes in water flow and circulation
44 P. 113, 114 (Wash. 1896) (internal citation omitted); see also Lamb v. Reclamation Dist.
No. 108, 14 P. 625, 628 (Cal. 1887) (en banc) (applying common enemy rule to a large
navigable river and the effects of the construction of a levee to protect adjacent lands from
the river overflow); King v. Comm'rs of Sewers for Pagham, 108 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1077, 8 B
& C 356, 358 (K.B. 1828) (adopting the common enemy rule). In his 1891 edition, the
nineteenth-century water law authority, John M. Gould, stated:
The owners of lands exposed to the inroads of the sea ... may erect walls and
embankments to prevent the wearing away of the land or to protect it from
overflow. It is lawful to embank against the sea, even when the effect may be to
cause the water to beat with increased violence against the adjoining land ....
GOULD, supra note 1, § 160, at 320-21.
295. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 290, § 10.03(b)(2), at 10-49 to -
50; 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 59.02(b)(3), at 196 (Robert E. Beck ed., Lexis Nexis
ed. 1991, Supp. 2004) [hereinafter 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS].
296. Other than the Shell Island case itself, the author has not found another case in
which the civil rule was expressly or implicitly applied to coastal erosion control structures.
297. See 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 295, § 59.02(b)(7), at 746-53
(explaining that twenty-two states follow the reasonable use rule, seventeen states follow
the civil rule, twelve states and the District of Columbia follow the common enemy rule,
and that Alabama applies all three rules, with the application depending on the context).
298. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 290, § 10.03(b)(3), at 10-59 to -68
(discussing the history of reasonable use rule). The reasonable use rule is becoming the
dominant approach to drainage disputes. Id. § 10.03(b)(3), at 10-60 to -61.
299. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 583 N.E.2d 894, 900, n.16 (Mass. App. Ct.)
(noting that regulations prohibiting construction of rock revetment on beach area
"essentially prevents the creation of a nuisance by property owners who would prevent the
natural disposition of sand along the beachfront"), affd 597 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1992).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
patterns caused by the structure. For example, in Lummis v. Lilly,3"
in which the issue was liability associated with the maintenance of a
groin,30' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that, in
addition to whether the groin owner had obtained the proper permits,
[o]ther factors bearing on the reasonableness of the use are the
purpose of the use, the suitability of the use to the water course,
the economic value of the use, the social value of the use, the
extent of harm that it causes, the practicality of avoiding the
harm ... , the protection of existing values of water uses, land,
investments, and enterprise, and the justice of requiring the
user who is causing the harm to bear the loss ....
These criteria are the same criteria which the United States Supreme
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission30 3 suggested be
used to determine whether a coastal regulation that prohibited any
development on an oceanfront lot was an unconstitutional taking or
not.3" What is interesting is that in both contexts, Lummis and
Lucas, the underlying premise is the oceanfront property owner has
the right to engage in the activity unless it is an unreasonable use and
constitutes a nuisance.
3. The Law of North Carolina
Until 1977, North Carolina followed a modified civil rule to
diffuse surface water litigation.35 Then, in Pendergrast v. Aiken,30 6
the Supreme Court of North Carolina jettisoned that rule and
adopted the "reasonable use" rule. 7  To the extent Pendergrast
300. 429 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 1982).
301. A groin is a small wall or barrier built perpendicular to the shoreline that is
intended to trap sand moving in longshore currents. They can be made of wood, stone,
concrete, steel, or other materials. Although groins are sometimes confused with jetties,
jetties are built next to inlets and perform a different function. The purpose of a jetty is to
keep sand from filling in navigation channels. PILKEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 91-93
(1998).
302. Lummis, 429 N.E.2d at 1150 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 805A
(1979)).
303. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
304. Id. at 1030-31.
305. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 242, § 16-10 ("North Carolina has never applied the
common-enemy rule.' ").
306. 293 N.C. 201,236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
307. Id. at 216, 236 S.E.2d at 796. The court did not see itself as jettisoning the civil
rule. Instead, it read prior cases as gradually modifying the civil law rule until it became
the "reasonable use rule." Id. at 211-14, 236 S.E.2d at 793-95. The court said:
We do not view the formal adoption of the rule of reasonable use as an innovation
in the law of North Carolina. In the past, modifications in drainage water law have
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recognizes the right of landowners to divert diffuse surface waters
away from their land, the same reasoning applies to oceanfront
property owners' diversion of ocean waters. Strengthening that
conclusion is the fact that by the time of the Pendergrast decision the
court already was applying the modern reasonable use doctrine to
other aspects of North Carolina water law.3" So after Pendergrast, a
reasonable conclusion is that the reasonable use doctrine applies to
the resolution of all riparian and littoral water usage questions
involving activities of private parties, including construction of
erosion control structures.30 9
been piecemeal as required by time and circumstance. Our action today simply
recognizes that fact and approves a rule.
Id. at 218, 236 S.E.2d 797-98.
308. See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 242, § 16-7, at 765 ("In North Carolina the
reasonable use' doctrine of water usage which embodies the principle that all riparian
owners on a watercourse have equal rights with respect to the removal and use of water
from the watercourse."); id. § 16-9, at 770 ("With respect to percolating waters, North
Carolina follows the 'reasonable use' doctrine."); see also Aycock supra note 204, (noting
the Supreme Court of North Carolina's adoption of reasonable use rule for riparian
rights).
309. The qualification "involving private parties" is necessary because of one
important exception to the application of the reasonable use doctrine. The exception to
the application of the reasonable use doctrine is that it does not apply to water diversions
that injure private property when the entity responsible for the diversion has the power of
eminent domain. In that situation, the entity can not escape liability for the damage it
causes by claiming that the interference with the flow of surface or stream water was
reasonable, but is strictly liable for the damage. See generally Lea Co. v. Bd. of Transp.,
308 N.C. 603, 304 S.E.2d 164 (1983) (1-40 ramps obstructed creek and caused overflow of
water onto plaintiff's land); Bd. of Transp. v. Terminal Warehouse Corp., 300 N.C. 700,
268 S.E.2d 180 (1980) (Board of Transportation changed water flow in stream with a
culvert and retaining water). But see Akzona, Inc. v. S. Ry. Co., 314 N.C. 488, 334 S.E.2d
759 (1985) ("A single instance of flooding with no possibility of recurrence, even if the
direct result of Railroad's structure, is not a taking of Akzona's property."). According to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina:
[T]he doctrine of reasonable use adopted in Pendergrast defines the extent to
which a private landowner may interfere with the flow of surface water on the
property of another .... [However, w]here the interference with surface waters is
affected by such an entity [possessing the power to appropriate private property],
the principle of reasonable use articulated in Pendergrast is superseded by the
constitutional mandate that "[w]hen private property is taken for public use, just
compensation must be paid."
Bd. of Transp., 300 N.C. at 705-06, 268 S.E.2d at 184 (1980) (quoting Eller v. Bd. of Educ.,
242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955)). This exception is not applicable to the denial of an
oceanfront property owner's application for a permit to build a seawall or other hardened
shoreline protection structure and does not mean that the State is liable for any damages
caused by ocean waters that result from the inability of the private property owner to
build a seawall or other hardened shoreline protection structure.
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C. Custom and Regulatory Practice
If past practice in North Carolina is any guide to whether a
riparian or littoral owner has a right to erect a permanent erosion
control structure, then it too supports the existence of such a right.
The State did not seriously begin to regulate beach erosion control
structures until 1979,310 and a ban was not imposed until January
1985.311 Prior to that time, private oceanfront property owners built
seawalls and other hardened erosion control structures in a number of
locations along the North Carolina coast.312 This activity suggests a
A seawall may provide some protection to the oceanfront property it fronts, but it
also has serious destructive consequences for adjacent oceanfront land owned by other
individuals or entities, has the potential to destroy the dry sand beach, an area over which
the North Carolina public has a common law right of use based on custom or the public
trust doctrine, and may even destroy the wet sand beach, which is part of the state-owned
public trust lands and also subject to public trust rights of use. There is nothing in the
opinions creating the exception which in any way suggests that the State is somehow liable
to a private property owner when the State acts reasonably to deny that property owner
such a permit in order to protect other private property owners (who themselves could
assert that the seawall was an unreasonable use), the public interest in dry sand beaches,
or state-owned public trust lands. To suggest otherwise would be akin to asserting that an
oceanfront property owner has a vested license to injure or destroy adjacent private and
state-owned property and the public interest in the dry sand beach and that the State must
pay to protect those public and private interests. That is a far cry from the type of cases in
which the exception to the reasonable use doctrine has been applied.
310. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, r. 07H.0308 (Aug. 2002) (regulating specific use
standards for ocean hazard areas), available at http://www.nccoastalmanagement
.net/Rules/fext/tl5a_07h.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Rule
07H.0308(a) addresses ocean shoreline erosion control activities. This rule provided that,
in emergency situations, property owners could obtain a permit "to protect ....
[threatened] structures [existing as of June 1, 1979] along the ocean front by means of
bulkheads, seawalls, or similar structures . I..." d. r. 07H.0308(a)(3). In 1971, authority
for the "Protection of Sand Dunes Along The Outer Banks" was given to local
governments and, in their absence, the North Carolina Environmental Management
Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 104-B3 to -B16 (repealed 1979). But it had "little
impact upon the construction of erosion control structures." E-mail from Professor
Spencer Rogers, Coastal Geologist, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, to
Lauren Pogue, Research Assistant, University of North Carolina School of Law (Jun. 30,
2004) (on file with author).
311. PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 29, at 4 (explaining that Maine banned hard
stabilization in 1982 and North Carolina followed suit in 1985).
312. According to David W. Owens, Associate Professor of Public Law and
Government and Assistant Director, Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, no formal survey to determine the extent of beach hardening was
done prior to the imposition of the beach hardening ban by the Coastal Resources
Commission in 1985. But "[t]here were several instances of devices being installed all
along the coast, but mostly very small scale instances." E-mail from David W. Owens,
Associate Professor of Public Law and Government and Assistant Director, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, to Professor Joseph Kalo,
University of North Carolina School of Law (Jul. 19, 2004) (on file with author). At the
time the ban was being considered, Professor Owen was an attorney and staff member of
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recognition of a right, with regulation increasing as evidence of the
harmful effects of such actions became clearer.
Coastal sound waters and shorelines are areas of statutorily
designated areas of environmental concern313 just as ocean shorelines
are. Yet, it has been a common practice to construct permanent
erosion control structures, such as bulkheads, along coastal sound
shorelines. 314  Until 1978, the construction of bulkheads along the
sound shoreline was not regulated.315 The current CAMA rules,
under the heading of "General Permit for Construction of Bulkheads
and The Placement of Riprap for Shoreline Protection in Estuarine
and Public Trust Waters, '316 implicitly acknowledge the general right
to construct such erosion control structures but regulate the
placement of bulkheads to assure that the construction of a particular
bulkhead does not harm adjacent riparian owners, interfere with
public trust rights, or cause adverse environmental consequences.317
the Coastal Resources Commission. And, from 1984 to 1989, he was the director of the
Division of Coastal Management. He is a recognized authority on the North Carolina
Coastal Management Act.
According to Professor Spencer Rogers, "a relatively long length of
underdesigned concrete bulkhead [constructed after Hurricane Donna in 1960] is still in
place in the center of Atlantic Beach. It ... was buried by a beach nourishment project
beginning in 1978. A shorter wooden bulkhead in Kure Beach was extensively repaired
following Hurricane Fran in 1996 but is now buried behind ... [a 1997] dune and beach
nourishment .... E-mail from Professor Spencer Rogers, Coastal Geologist, University
of North Carolina at Wilmington, to Jessica Odom, Research Assistant, University of
North Carolina School of Law (Jun. 30, 2004) (on file with author).
An example of the beach hardening which took place before the imposition of the
ban can be found in photographs in ORRIN PILKEY ET AL., How To READ A NORTH
CAROLINA BEACH 136, fig. 7.2 (2004) (showing an old seawall at Casewell Beach,
destroyed by Hurricane Bonnie in 1998). See Frank Tursi, Experts Worry About Beach
Projects' Large Scale Interference; Against the Tide?, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 12, 2001, at
Al (including a photo of seawall a Pine Knoll Shores pier).
313. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-113(b)(2), (8), (9) (2003); see also N.C. ADMIN
CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0205 (Aug. 1998); id. r. 7H.0207 (Aug. 1998) (regulating estuarine
waters); id. r. 7H.0205 (Oct. 1993) (regulating public trust areas).
314. According to Mike Lopanski, while there are not definite numbers, he is
comfortable saying that miles and miles of the sound shoreline are armored. Interview by
Lauren Pogue with Mike Lopanski, Coastal Policy Analyst, N.C. Div. of Coastal
Management (Jun. 12,2004).
315. The first CAMA rule regulating construction of bulkheads and placement of
riprap in estuarine and public trust waters went into effect in 1978. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit.
15A, r. 7KH.0208 (Jun. 1981) (eff. Mar. 29, 1978) (regulating bulkhead and shoreline
stabilization). The current regulations are found at N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
7H.1100 (Dec. 1991-Aug. 1998) (regulating general permit for construction of bulkheads).
316. Id. r. 7H.1100.
317. See id. r. 7H.1104(c) (Aug. 1998) ("There shall be no significant interference with
navigation or use of the waters by the public by the existence of the bulkhead or the riprap
authorized herein."). This regulation further states:
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As a general matter, such erosion control devices are authorized for
shorelines devoid of marsh grass and other wetland vegetation3 18 so
long as neighboring property owners do not object,319 there is no
interference with navigation or use of the waters by the public, 3 0 and
certain specific construction requirements are satisfied.3"1 The sense
of the CAMA rule is that, at the present time, riparian owners have a
general right to erect erosion control structures, but the general right
is subject to reasonable regulation to protect neighboring property
owners' shoreline and public rights of navigation and public trust uses
of coastal waters and resources.
D. Oceanfront Erosion Control Structures as Per Se Unreasonable
Application of the reasonable use doctrine does not mean that
the State may not prohibit the construction of erosion control
structures in certain situations or environments. In the context of
Pendergrast, it is a matter of balancing the interests of individual
landowners in an age of more intensive land use that necessitates
modification of natural drainage patterns through the changing of the
contours of the land and the installation of drainage systems. 2 The
issue is generally whether the receiving landowners must bear the
burden and costs of increased flows of surface water or whether the
sending landowners must.3 23  In the context of seawalls and other
erosion control structures the effect of the erosion control structure is
not limited to neighboring privately owned lands. Such structures do
change wave and water flow patterns in such a way as to increase the
intensity of the wave and water action on neighboring littoral lands
and increase the rate of erosion of neighboring lands.3 24 That is why
This permit will not be applicable to proposed construction where the Department
has determined based on an initial review of the application, that notice and
review pursuant to G.S. 113A-119 is necessary because there are unresolved
questions concerning the proposed activity's impact on adjoining properties or on
water quality; air quality; coastal wetlands; cultural or historic sites; wildlife;
fisheries resources; or public trust rights.
Id. r. 7H.1104(d).
318. Id. r. 7H.1105(a) (Dec. 1991).
319. Id. r. 7H.1102(b)(1) (Jan. 1990).
320. Id. r. 7H.1104 (c), (d) (Aug. 1998).
321. Id. r. 7H.1105 (Aug. 1998).
322. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217-18, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797-98 (1977).
323. Id.; see also 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 290, § 10.03(b)(3), at 10-
59 to -68 (discussing the history of the reasonable use rule, its underlying policies, and
factors important to its application).
324. See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 271, at 53 (describing "end effect"); see also Chris
Dixon, The Seawall Amendment: A Discussion, at http://www.surfermag.com/features/
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once one littoral owner constructs a seawall or other erosion control
structure it becomes necessary for neighboring littoral owners to do
the same to protect their shoreline.3" But structures also have a
documented, serious, adverse impact upon public trust lands and
rights. Erosion control structures may lead to the destruction of the
dry sand beach, adversely affecting the public's right to use the
shoreline and public trust waters.3 26  Therefore, it is arguable that
such structures along ocean and inlet shorelines are per se
unreasonable and can be banned as nuisances. In sound and coastal
river waters where, at the present time and state of scientific
knowledge, the impact upon public trust lands and waters does not
appear as severe, owners of waterfront property may continue to
construct erosion control structures subject to the reasonable use rule.
Thus, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in
Shell Island is correct-oceanfront property owners have no common
law or statutory right to construct permanent erosion control
structures. Therefore, the ban on such structures does not constitute
a compensable taking of any private property right of oceanfront
property owners.327
VI. No RIGHT To PIER OUT INTO OCEAN WATERS
Earlier, in Part III of this Article, the right of access to the
navigable portion of the waterbody was discussed. That traditional
common law right is composed of two parts. The first is the right of
access to the navigable portion of the water body, or deep water.3
28
The second is the related right, subject to reasonable restrictions, to
pier out to reach deep or navigable water. There is an important
distinction between these two common law rights. The right of access
oneworld/seawall/ (describing the "end around effect" of seawalls) (last visited Aug. 22,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
325. DEAN, supra note 271, at 53.
326. Id. at 53-56 (describing destructive effects upon public beaches); see also PILKEY
& DIXON, supra note 29, at 40-42 (illustrating destructive effect with photographs).
327. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, the Court makes it clear that a
regulatory prohibition of activities that constitute nuisances under state law are not
compensable regulatory takings. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-31 (1992); see also supra note 309
and accompanying discussion of the impacts of seawalls upon other landowners, including
the state's common law public trust rights.
328. See In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 27, 337 S.E.2d 99, 105 (1985); 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(1), at 6-6. "Deep water" is defined
in section 146-64 of the General Statutes of North Carolina as "the depth reasonably
necessary to provide and allow reasonable access for all vessels traditionally used in the
main watercourse area." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(10) (2003).
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to deep or navigable waters is not subject to question; the right of
oceanfront property owners to pier out is.
The right of access to deep water means there must be no
unreasonable impediments or obstructions created to keep the
waterfront owner from having access across the waterbody to the
point at which it becomes navigable-in-fact.329 The area over which
this right exists is called the "area[] of riparian access, ' 330 the outer
limit of which is the line of deep water and the sidelines determined
by drawing perpendicular sidelines from the deep Water to the point
at which the upland property line meets the shore.331 For oceanfront
property owners, deep or navigable-in-fact waters generally lie within
a short distance of the shoreline; the frontage is not very extensive so
the typical area of access would be small. So long as there are no
unreasonable impediments or obstructions to accessing deep water,
this right is satisfied.
The right to wharf or pier out means that, in order to access
navigable-in-fact waters, the waterfront property owner may place
structures-obstructions-seaward of the mean high tide line in state
public trust waters and on state-owned public trust submerged lands.
Frequently in opinions or in treatises the statement appears that any
waterfront property owner, subject to reasonable regulation, has such
a right.332 In its unqualified form, that statement appears to be
329. See Mason, 78 N.C. App. at 25-28, 337 S.E.2d at 104-06. In Mason, the Marine
Fisheries Commission leased a portion of state-owned submerged lands for a clam culture
operation. Part of the leased area was within Mason's area of riparian access. The trial
court decided "the lease would interfere with ... [his] rights to 'navigation, recreation,
[and] access to the navigable portions of Core Sound.' "Id. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 104. Since
the lease stated it was "subject to the lawful exercise of. .. [Mason's riparian] rights," and
contained specific conditions, such as a 100 foot set-off from the shoreline, the court
determined rights were adequately protected. Id. at 26-29, 337 S.E.2d at 105-06. See
generally Becker v. Litty, 566 A.2d 1101, 1004-05 (Md. 1989) (holding the right to navigate
the waterbody is a public right not a private riparian or littoral right); 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(1), at 6-4 to -7 (explaining the riparian right is a
right of access to the beginning of navigable-in-fact waters, it does not include the right to
navigate the waterbody).
330. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.1205(o) (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.nccoastalmanagement.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_07h.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); see also Mason, 78 N.C. App. at 28, 337 S.E.2d at 106 (riparian
access zone extends to navigable part of waterway and lateral boundaries determined in
accordance with applicable CAMA regulation).
331. CAMA regulations contain a description of the area of riparian access for coastal
waters, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.1205(o) (Apr. 2003), and illustrative diagrams,
id. r. 7H.1205(r).
332. See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 62 at 279 ("The riparian owner is also entitled to
have his contact with the water remain intact. This is what is known as the right of access,
and includes the right to erect wharves to reach the navigable portion of the stream. The
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incorrect. Owners of land abutting interior sound waters, coastal and
inland rivers, and lakes have such a right, but insofar as oceanfront
property owners are concerned, no such right in reality exists.
Although it is true that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has on
two occasions stated that oceanfront owners have such a right, on
both occasions the statement was pure dicta. In Capune v. Robbins,333
the issue was whether a pier owner had the legal right to throw pop
bottles at a surfboarder who was passing under his pier.334 As part of
its discussion, the court accepted the right of the owner to build the
pier, but held that ownership of the pier did not include the right to
control the waters below the pier and use pop bottles to discourage
surfboarders from passing under the pier. Two years later, in
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach,335 the
issue was whether the owner of a pier destroyed by a hurricane and
storms, whose shoreline uplands had completely eroded away, still
retained title. The court held he did not retain title to the area after it
was raised above the mean high water mark as the result of a
government beach rehabilitation project.33 6  In that case, again in
dicta, the court stated that a "littoral owner may... in exercise of his
right of access, construct a pier in order to provide passage from the
upland to the sea." '337 Therefore neither case provides an analysis of,
or justification for, the assumed right of an oceanfront owner to
construct a pier. Furthermore, even if the assumed right exists, it only
enables an owner to reach deep or navigable waters,338 which for the
most part lie within a few feet of the shoreline, and not several
hundred feet. Therefore, if there is such a right, any such piers would
be rather short and not of the length of the typical commercial ocean
pier. The typical ocean pier extends a considerable distance out into
the ocean, a distance that is greater than that needed to reach "deep"
wharfage right is subject to several limitations, however. ); see also GOULD, supra
note 1, § 168, at 334-36 (discussing the right to wharf out in the United States, noting, "[i]n
this country this rule is subject to reasonable limitations"); 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(a)(2), at 6-20 to -42 (discussing right to wharf out and
regulations that the federal and state governments have placed on that right); supra note
19 and accompanying text.
333. 273 N.C. 581,160 S.E.2d 881 (1968).
334. Id. at 587, 160 S.E.2d at 885.
335. 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
336. Id. at 301, 177 S.E.2d at 515
337. Id. at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 516-17.
338. See, e.g., In re Protest of Mason, 78 N.C. App. 16, 28, 337 S.E.2d 99, 105-06 (1985)
(holding that right of access only extends to navigable part of waterbody); Bond v. Wool,
107 N.C. 139, 147-52, 12 S.E. 281, 284-86 (1890) (discussing qualified riparian and littoral
right to pier out to navigable (deep) water).
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or "navigable waters." The State, of course, may authorize the
construction of lengthy ocean piers and grant easements for that
purpose.3 39 But the pier would exist as a matter of grace, not right.
All other decided cases in which the right to wharf-out or construct a
pier was in issue involved inland waters, not ocean waters. Therefore
I would assert, despite the language of Capune and Carolina Beach, it
is an open question whether oceanfront or inlet front property owners
have the littoral right to wharf-out or construct piers. And, an
examination of the historical evolution of that littoral right and the
practical and legal impediments to constructing ocean and inlet piers
leads to a conclusion that oceanfront and inlet front owners have no
such littoral right.
At early common law, riparian and littoral owners did not have a
right to wharf-out or construct piers. Absent the express permission
of the Crown, the placement of wharfs, piers, or other structures
below the mean high water mark was viewed as an enjoinable
encroachment upon public trust lands, which could be seized,
removed or destroyed at the discretion of the Crown.' However, in
this country, from its earliest days, the necessity of wharves and piers
to the promotion and maintenance of water commerce and travel
dictated a different approach. Riparian and littoral owners in port
and harbor areas and elsewhere were encouraged to build wharves,
piers, and other similar facilities essential to the water transportation
of cargo and people.34 By the end of the nineteenth century, this
custom had evolved into a common law right to erect wharves, piers
and other facilities.342 But this "right" was constrained by the public's
right of use of navigable waters. If a wharf, pier, or other structure
339. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-12 (2003) (authority to grant easements to riparian and
littoral owners in state-owned lands covered by navigable waters).
340. ANGELL, supra note 34, at 132-33; GOULD, supra note 1, § 167, at 334.
341. ANGELL, supra note 34, at 125-26, 163; see also 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 113,
at 526.
342. In his 1826 treatise, Joseph Angell argues that the custom of encouraging the
littoral and riparian owners to construct wharves, piers and similar facilities below the
mean high water mark has in fact become a common law property right of such owners.
ANGELL, supra note 34, at 125-63. By the time Gould wrote his 1883 A Treatise on the
Law of Waters, the existence of the common law right appears to be well established in
most states. GOULD, supra note 1, § 140, at 281 ("The right to build out wharves or piers
into public waters, as incident to the ownership of the adjoining land, is a riparian right
..... "); see also id. § 168 at 334 ("In this country this rule is subject to reasonable
limitations. ). And, in his treatise on The Law of Waters and Water Rights, Henry
Farnham states that "it therefore became established at an early date that it was lawful for
the owner of the shore to erect a wharf and other necessary adjuncts to the interchange of
commerce upon it .... 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 113, at 526; see also id. § 113b, at
533-39 (describing the law in the United States as of 1904).
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interfered with the public right of navigation and commerce,
including the use of a harbor or port, then the interference was a
public nuisance and could be removed.3 43  To prevent such
interferences and to assure the safe and efficient operation of
commercially important harbor and port areas, the actual exercise of
the right to place structures such as piers or wharves into public water
has, unlike other littoral and riparian rights, been the subject of
extensive and detailed government regulation.' Construction of an
ocean pier requires a state easement, state and federal permits and
associated environmental impact studies. 345
Not only is the right to wharf-out or construct piers highly
regulated, but realistically in coastal areas, commercial wharfs and
piers are to be found in sheltered bays and harbors, and recreational
piers, in the sheltered waters of sounds and coastal rivers and streams;
piers are not found along the ocean shoreline. The number of piers
that actually exist along North Carolina's ocean shoreline is very
small. 6 Except for the Army Corps of Engineers' Research Pier in
343. See ANGELL, supra note 34, at 132-33, 150, 162; GOULD, supra note 1, § 140, at
281-82.
344. See ANGELL, supra note 34, at 127; 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15, § 110(b), at 518-
19, § 113, at 528, § 113(b), at 533; GOULD, supra note 1, § 138, at 276-79; § 168, at 334-36.
Farnham and Gould differ slightly on the scope of the right. Farnham states that "a
riparian owner has the right, by virtue of his ownership, to connect his shore line by
artificial connections with outside navigable water, subject to such regulations-not
amounting to prohibition-as the state may establish .... " 1 FARNHAM, supra note 15,
§ 113b, at 533, whereas Gould states that the right is subject to "the common rights of the
people in these waters." GOULD, supra note 1, § 168, at 334.
345. Among the permits required would be North Carolina CAMA major
development permit and a USACE permit.
346. Along the whole 301 miles of North Carolina coastline, as of May 24, 2005, there
appear to be only twenty-seven ocean piers. There are no ocean piers in Currituck
County; eight in Dare County (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Research Pier, Avalon,
Nags Head, Jennette's, Outer Banks, Rodanthe, Avon, and Frisco); none in Hyde County;
five in Carteret County (Triple S, Sportsman's, Oceanana, Bogue Inlet, and Sheraton);
four in Onslow and Pender Counties (Salty's/Seaview, Surf City, Riseley [owned by the
U.S. Marine Corps], and Jolly Roger); four in New Hanover County (Johnnie Mercer,
Oceanic, formerly Crystal pier, Carolina Beach and Kure); and six in Brunswick County
(Yaupon, Long Beach, Ocean Isle, Ocean Crest, Holden Beach, and Sunset Beach). E-
mail from Stacy Peterson, Outer Banks Chamber of Commerce, to Jessica Odom,
Research Assistant, University of North Carolina School of Law (May 2005) (containing
information relating to the Currituck County and Dare County piers) (on file with
author); Telephone interview with William N. Lovelandy, Jr., Office of Counsel, Engineer
Research and Development Center (Jan. 2005) (discussing information relating to the
Dare County U.S. Army Corps of Engineers pier); E-mail from Margie Brooks, Greater
Hoke County Chamber of Commerce, to Jessica Odom, Research Assistant, University of
North Carolina School of Law (Feb. 2005) (containing information relating to Hyde
County) (on file with author); Telephone interview with Laura Wright, Carteret County
Chamber of Commerce (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the Carteret
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Duck and the Oceanic restaurant pier in Wrightsville Beach, all of
these oceanfront piers are long commercial ones,3 47 the construction
of which was not by right, but required an easement from the state
and state and federal permits. Part of the reason for this is no doubt
practical, and another part is legal. Piers in oceanfront areas pose
problems not presented by the placement of piers in sound waters or
coastal rivers. The beaches, certainly seaward of the mean high tide
line and perhaps extending even to the vegetation line, are open to
public use. To protect the public right to use the beach, any pier must
be built high enough that
the passage under the pier must be free and substantially
unobstructed over the entire width of the foreshore. This
means that from high to low water mark it must be at such a
height that the public will have no difficulty in walking under it
County piers); Telephone interview with Annie Walker, Jacksonville/Onslow County
Chamber of Commerce (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the Onslow and
Pender County piers); Telephone interview with Karen Warren, Cape Fear Coast
Convention and Visitors Bureau (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the New
Hanover County piers); Telephone interview with Brunswick County Chamber of
Commerce (Feb. 2004) (discussing information relating to Brunswick County).
As a result of storm damage, a number of piers no longer exist: Kitty Hawk (Dare
County); Iron Steamer, Indian Beach, and Emerald Isle (Carteret County); Scotch
Bonnet, Ocean City, Barnacle Bill's (Onslow and Pender Counties); and Center (New
Hanover County). E-mail from Stacy Peterson, Outer Banks Chamber of Commerce, to
Jessica Odom, Research Assistant, University of North Carolina School of Law (May
2005) (containing information relating to the Currituck County and Dare County piers)
(on file with author); Telephone interview with Laura Wright, Carteret County Chamber
of Commerce (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the Carteret County piers);
Telephone interview with Annie Walker, Jacksonville/Onslow County Chamber of
Commerce (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the Onslow and Pender County
piers); Telephone interview with Karen Warren, Cape Fear Coast Convention and
Visitors Bureau (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the New Hanover County
piers).
There are only fifty feet of Jennette's Pier still standing, but there are plans to
rebuild sometime in the near future. E-mail from Stacy Peterson, Outer Banks Chamber
of Commerce, to Jessica Odom, Research Assistant, University of North Carolina School
of Law (May 2005) (on file with author).
347. Of the twenty-seven existing ocean piers on the North Carolina coast, only the
Army Corps of Engineers' Research Pier (Dare County) and the Oceanic restaurant pier
(New Hanover County) do not allow public fishing. Telephone interview with William N.
Lovelandy, Jr., Office of Counsel, Engineer Research and Development Center (Jan.
2005) (discussing information relating to the Dare County U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
pier); Telephone interview with Karen Warren, Cape Fear Coast Convention and Visitors
Bureau (May 2005) (discussing information relating to the New Hanover County piers).
No new pier has been constructed for at least a decade, if not longer. Telephone interview
with Doug Huggett, Manager, CAMA Major Permits, North Carolina Division of Coastal
Management, Morehead City office (May 27, 2005).
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when the tide is low or in going under it in boats when the tide
is high.348
In addition, allowing placement of a large number of piers along the
shoreline would itself significantly hamper the public's ability to use
the beach. That no doubt provides both part of the reason so few
ocean piers exist and part of the legal justification for limiting the
construction and number of piers.
Building ocean piers, even small ones, is expensive349 and owners
of piers have to confront the consequences of the dynamic nature of
wind, wave, and storm action along the Atlantic shoreline. Unless a
pier is constructed of extremely sturdy materials, it will not withstand
the forces of nature that characterize the coast. Every year even well-
constructed, large commercial ocean piers succumb to hurricanes,
storms, winds and waves. So the expense of constructing and
maintaining a pier and associated risks undoubtedly dissuade the few
who might be interested in having a private ocean pier. Finally, most
oceanfront owners really have no need for such piers. Most probably
don't have ocean-going craft, and those that do probably prefer to
dock or anchor their vessels in calmer, protected waters.
Of course, some oceanfront owners might still like a private
ocean pier. But, state Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA)
regulations implicitly prohibit them. CAMA regulations state:
(d) The following types of water dependent development shall
be permitted seaward of the oceanfront setback requirements
... if all other provisions of this Subchapter and other state and
local regulations are met:
348. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303,
177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (quoting Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 589, 160 S.E.2d 881,
886 (1986)).
349. One estimate was that it cost $800 to $1,000 a foot to build an ocean pier on
wooden pilings. Jerry Allegood, Tides Turning on Tar Heel Piers, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jul. 8, 1999, at Al. The Johnnie Mercer pier was rebuilt using concrete.
The owner declined to comment on the cost. Id.
350. Between 1996 and 1999, "a mix of storms and hurricanes has reduced the fishing
piers from 32 to 26." Id. According to Grace Construction Products, the company that
rebuilt the Johnnie Mercer pier in 2002, "[slince 1996, one-third of North Carolina's
fishing piers have been forced to close in the aftermath of a series of destructive storms."
Grace Construction Products, Concrete Admixtures, Project Profiles, Johnny Mercer's
Fishing Pier, at http://www.na.graceconstruction.com/template.cfm?page=/concrete/
concrete-projprof_ mercers.html&did=l (last visited Jun. 2, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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(1) piers providing public access .... 351
The regulations make no mention of private oceanfront piers as a
permissible form of development. The absence of any allowance for
private piers and the absence of such piers from the coastline strongly
suggest that oceanfront property owners have no littoral right to
construct and place piers in ocean waters. The commercial ocean
piers that exist are there not by right but by the grace of the State.
CONCLUSION
For over 200 years the rights of oceanfront property owners have
been evolving through the common law and legislative process. The
current list of littoral rights for oceanfront property owners would
include
(1) The right to all natural additions to the shoreline whether
the result of accretion or avulsion.
(2) The right to remain in contact with the ocean or inlet, which
right is subject to limitation by the State to protect legitimate
public trust interests. Such right may not be taken or
significantly impaired as the result of beach nourishment
projects or otherwise without payment of compensation or
providing a statutory substitute except when necessary to
protect legitimate public trust interests.
(3) The right not to have unreasonable impediments or
interferences with access to the beginning of the navigable
portion of ocean or inlet waters.
(4) The right to make reasonable use of adjacent ocean and
inlet waters.352
But the rights would not include
(1) A right to construct erosion control structures without
permission of the State.
351. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H0309(d)(1) (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.nccoastalmanagement.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_07h.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
352. This particular right was not the subject of discussion in this Article, but as of this
point in time no one has challenged the right of an oceanfront property owner to fish from
the shoreline, swim in adjacent ocean waters, or make similar non-consumptive uses of
adjacent ocean waters. Such uses by an oceanfront property owner would be no different
than such uses by the public exercising public trust rights.
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(2) A right to pier out into ocean waters without permission of
the state and federal government.
Whether North Carolina oceanfront owners have the right of
view is not clear. But if such a right exists, it should be treated the
same as the right to remain in direct contact with ocean and inlet
waters. All the listed rights are subject to being lost if through the
natural process of erosion or avulsive forces, all of the oceanfront
property becomes submerged land lying under ocean or inlet waters.
When the land is gone, all common law claims to the land and all
littoral rights are forever gone as well.
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